如何遏制法院

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现在又到了这个时候,似乎每隔几代人就会出现一次,即法院限制盛行。然而,这一时期的法院限制与之前法院限制成功的时期有着重要的不同。从这个明显的观点开始:在以前对法院的攻击以某种方式取得成功的情况下,挑战者拥有威胁法院的政治力量。现在,坦率地说,他们没有选票。仅仅因为这个原因,今天很多关于限制最高法院的讨论充其量是过于乐观了。我在这里要追问的核心问题是什么情况下法院才会真正处于危险之中?根据历史,我得出了一组简单的需求。必须有一种明确的危机,而不是对法院弥漫的沮丧和恐惧。在危机的性质与拟议的补救措施之间,还必须有一个重点突出的紧密契合。这两点对于获得公众对法院限制措施的支持都是必要的。第三,当然是选票:政治部门的支持对于采取反对最高法院的行动至关重要,因为公众——无论多么不满——不能单独惩罚最高法院。目前情况并非如此。法院确实存在危机,但它是各种问题的集合。没有一个集中的补救办法,而是一系列的建议。法院的一些裁决与公众情绪不符,引发了多数主义的争议,但其他裁决虽然在左翼不受欢迎,但仍得到了该国多数人的支持。也许最重要的是,政治体系已经陷入功能失调,以至于它不再代表大多数人,这使得挑战法院变得极其困难,即使法官们越过了界限。我的最后一个问题是未来会怎样。我探索了一系列可能性,从两党支持围绕最高法院法官遴选制度进行结构性改革,到法官们行动过于大胆以至于陷入困境并受到纪律处分。不过,我担心这样的结果最终不太可能出现,最终会把这个国家推向宪法危机。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What it Takes to Curb the Court
It is that time again, as it seems to be every several generations, when Court-curbing is in the air. And yet, this period of Court-curbing is importantly different from prior times in which Court-curbing was successful. Start with this obvious point: in prior instances in which attacks on the Court succeeded in some fashion, the challengers had the political muscle to threaten the Court. Now, to be blunt, they don’t have the votes. For that reason alone, much of today’s talk of curbing the Court is overly optimistic at best. The central question I pursue here is what it would take for the Court to be in actual jeopardy? Drawing from history, I derive a simple set of requirements. There must be a well-defined crisis, as opposed to diffuse frustration and dread about the Court. There also must be a focused, close fit between the nature of the crisis and the proposed remedy. Both of these are necessary to get public support behind a Court-curbing measure. And third, of course, is the votes: support in the political branches is essential to take action against the Court, for the public—no matter how discontent it might be—cannot punish the Court alone. None of this is the case at present. There is indeed a crisis surrounding the Court, but it is a collection of varied concerns. There is no one focal remedy, but a mélange of proposals. Some Court decisions are out of line with public sentiment and have engendered majoritarian controversy, but other decisions, while unpopular on the left, still have majority support in the country. Perhaps most important, the political system has slid into dysfunction such that it no longer represents majority will anyway—making it extremely difficult to challenge the Court, even if the justices slide over the line. The final question I take up is what the future might hold. I explore a range of possibilities, from bipartisan support for structural change around the selection system for Supreme Court justices to the justices moving so boldly that they get in hot water and are disciplined. Ultimately, though, I fear outcomes such as these are unlikely, ultimately driving the country toward constitutional crisis.
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来源期刊
Wisconsin Law Review
Wisconsin Law Review Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
16.70%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Wisconsin Law Review is a student-run journal of legal analysis and commentary that is used by professors, judges, practitioners, and others researching contemporary legal topics. The Wisconsin Law Review, which is published six times each year, includes professional and student articles, with content spanning local, state, national, and international topics. In addition to publishing the print journal, the Wisconsin Law Review publishes the Wisconsin Law Review Forward and sponsors an annual symposium at which leading scholars debate a significant issue in contemporary law.
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