{"title":"塞克斯图斯在原地","authors":"Anna Tigani","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343111","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Sextus’ discussion of ‘place’ we find an attempt to insulate the philosophical questions about the conception of place and the ordinary answers to questions about where certain things are from one another. Common moves in dialectical practice against begging the question are used to delimitate the two contexts. Contrary to Myles Burnyeat’s interpretation, I argue, through close reading of the relevant texts, that there is no inconsistency in Sextus’ attempt.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sextus on Place\",\"authors\":\"Anna Tigani\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/ancientphil202343111\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Sextus’ discussion of ‘place’ we find an attempt to insulate the philosophical questions about the conception of place and the ordinary answers to questions about where certain things are from one another. Common moves in dialectical practice against begging the question are used to delimitate the two contexts. Contrary to Myles Burnyeat’s interpretation, I argue, through close reading of the relevant texts, that there is no inconsistency in Sextus’ attempt.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38413,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ancient Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ancient Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343111\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ancient Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343111","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
In Sextus’ discussion of ‘place’ we find an attempt to insulate the philosophical questions about the conception of place and the ordinary answers to questions about where certain things are from one another. Common moves in dialectical practice against begging the question are used to delimitate the two contexts. Contrary to Myles Burnyeat’s interpretation, I argue, through close reading of the relevant texts, that there is no inconsistency in Sextus’ attempt.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
