战后暴力:解释冲突后国家的不稳定

Q3 Arts and Humanities
Parameters Pub Date : 2015-06-22 DOI:10.5860/choice.185026
James H. Lebovic
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It can occur when groups fragment to pursue their own (unclear) agendas by capitalizing on ethnic, religious, or political conflict and engaging in criminal activities by employing criminal gangs to mobilize resources and target opponents for \"strategic\" purposes. \"Not only can such violence be unconnected or only indirectly related to the cause of the war itself, but it can also provide a space for opportunists to pursue a variety of personal or criminal vendettas, some of which will be detached from the fighting that preceded it.\" In consequence, \"the violence of the post-conflict period will often appear as an inchoate mix of personal attacks, criminal violence, and political-strategic violence significantly different from violence in the war that preceded it\" (5). In Boyle's terminology, strategic violence mixes with \"expressive violence,\" an emotional response to loss or suffering, and \"instrumental violence,\" undertaken for criminal or personal gain. The analytical challenge is met, as Boyle recognizes, by ascertaining the collective (not individual) motives behind the violence, as discerned from tell-tale, aggregate patterns. For that effort, Boyle marshals revealing quantitative and qualitative evidence to portray trends over time in the various conflicts. According to Boyle, the key to understanding the role of strategic violence in post-conflict countries is appreciating the distinction between the \"direct pathway\" to violence in which the parties, targets, and issues in contestation remain relatively constant (from the conflict through the post-conflict periods) and the \"indirect pathway\" in which groups splinter and violence is a function of \"multiple and overlapping bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and resources\" (12). In discussing these pathways, Boyle's central argument reduces to four hypotheses that derive from a \"2-by-2\" table, structured around two binary variables. 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引用次数: 28

摘要

迈克尔·j·博伊尔的新书《战后暴力:解释冲突后国家的不稳定》作者:马里兰州巴尔的摩:约翰·霍普金斯大学出版社,2014年,448页69.95美元[插图略]迈克尔·j·博伊尔的新书对波黑、科索沃、卢旺达、东帝汶和伊拉克的冲突后暴力提供了一个受欢迎的视角。尽管有这样的趋势,但这本书让读者更普遍地意识到一种谬论,即假设各国已经进入了冲突后状态,表面上看战争已经结束。当各方试图通过暴力“重新谈判”和平条款时,冲突就会持续下去,当新的政党出现,要求获得权力时,当联盟在分配利益的争端中解散时,冲突就会持续下去。因此,这本书将重点放在“战略暴力”上,即“旨在改变一个国家的权力和资源平衡”(8)。这种暴力最明显的表现是,当一个或多个冲突方试图挑战已经达成协议的条款时,可能是在胁迫或虚假的借口下。但战略性暴力有时有更复杂的解释,证据支持含糊不清。当团体分裂为追求自己的(不明确的)议程,利用种族、宗教或政治冲突,以及通过雇佣犯罪团伙调动资源和针对“战略”目的的对手进行犯罪活动时,就会发生这种情况。“这种暴力行为不仅可能与战争本身无关,或者只是间接相关,而且还可能为机会主义者提供空间,以实现各种各样的个人或犯罪报复,其中一些报复将与之前的战斗分离开来。”因此,“冲突后时期的暴力往往表现为个人攻击、犯罪暴力和政治战略暴力的早期混合,这与之前的战争暴力有很大不同”(5)。用博伊尔的术语来说,战略暴力与“表达性暴力”(对损失或痛苦的情感反应)和“工具性暴力”(为犯罪或个人利益而进行的暴力)混合在一起。正如博伊尔所认识到的那样,通过确定暴力背后的集体(而非个人)动机,从泄密的、聚集的模式中辨别出来,分析性的挑战得以解决。为此,博伊尔收集了定量和定性的证据,描绘了各种冲突的长期趋势。博伊尔认为,理解战略性暴力在冲突后国家中的作用的关键是认识到暴力的“直接途径”之间的区别,在这种“直接途径”中,各方、目标、争论中的问题保持相对不变(从冲突到冲突后时期),“间接途径”是群体分裂和暴力是“新出现的和新兴的权力和资源要求者之间多重重叠的讨价还价游戏”的功能(12)。在讨论这些途径时,博伊尔的中心论点减少到四个假设,这些假设来自一个“2乘2”的表,围绕两个二元变量结构。这些变量是:a)原始当事方是否接受了和解,b)这些当事方对其成员资格行使多少控制权。简单地说,战略暴力在一方拒绝接受解决方案时通过直接途径出现,在控制水平较低时通过间接途径出现。因此,当一方拒绝解决方案和控制水平较低时,战略性暴力可以通过直接和间接途径同时发生。在提出这些假设并对照案例证据进行检验的过程中,博伊尔超越了早期理论章节的主要描述重点,解释了战略性暴力的发生。在其启发性的细节中,案例研究分析为博伊尔的挑衅性论点提供了支持。然而,这也凸显了本书的局限性,如下所述:首先,博伊尔方法的实用性依赖于2乘2表格的可行性,该表格隐含地假设任何一方失去控制和不接受解决方案都会产生相同的结果。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Violence after War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States
Violence After War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States By Michael J. Boyle Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014 448 pages $69.95 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Michael J. Boyle's new book offers a welcome look at post-conflict violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, and Iraq. Despite its tide, the book sensitizes readers more generally to the fallacy of assuming that countries have graduated to post-conflict status with the ostensible end in fighting. Conflict can persist when parties seek to "renegotiate" the terms of a peace through violence, new parties arise to stake their claim to power, or coalitions dissolve in disputes over the division of the spoils. The book focuses accordingly on "strategic violence" which is "designed to transform the balance of power and resources in a state" (8). Such violence is most obvious when one or more of the contending parties seeks to challenge the terms of a settlement having agreed to them, perhaps, under duress or false pretenses. But strategic violence sometimes has a more complex explanation with ambiguous evidentiary support. It can occur when groups fragment to pursue their own (unclear) agendas by capitalizing on ethnic, religious, or political conflict and engaging in criminal activities by employing criminal gangs to mobilize resources and target opponents for "strategic" purposes. "Not only can such violence be unconnected or only indirectly related to the cause of the war itself, but it can also provide a space for opportunists to pursue a variety of personal or criminal vendettas, some of which will be detached from the fighting that preceded it." In consequence, "the violence of the post-conflict period will often appear as an inchoate mix of personal attacks, criminal violence, and political-strategic violence significantly different from violence in the war that preceded it" (5). In Boyle's terminology, strategic violence mixes with "expressive violence," an emotional response to loss or suffering, and "instrumental violence," undertaken for criminal or personal gain. The analytical challenge is met, as Boyle recognizes, by ascertaining the collective (not individual) motives behind the violence, as discerned from tell-tale, aggregate patterns. For that effort, Boyle marshals revealing quantitative and qualitative evidence to portray trends over time in the various conflicts. According to Boyle, the key to understanding the role of strategic violence in post-conflict countries is appreciating the distinction between the "direct pathway" to violence in which the parties, targets, and issues in contestation remain relatively constant (from the conflict through the post-conflict periods) and the "indirect pathway" in which groups splinter and violence is a function of "multiple and overlapping bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and resources" (12). In discussing these pathways, Boyle's central argument reduces to four hypotheses that derive from a "2-by-2" table, structured around two binary variables. These variables are: a) whether the original parties have accepted a settlement and b) how much control these parties exercise over their membership. Simply put, strategic violence emerges through the direct pathway when a party refuses to accept a settlement and through the indirect pathway when the level of control is low. Consequently, strategic violence can occur simultaneously through the direct and indirect pathway when a party refuses a settlement and when the level of control is low. In positing these hypotheses and testing them against the case evidence, Boyle moves beyond the largely descriptive focus of the early theoretical chapters to explain the occurrence of strategic violence. In its illuminating detail, the case-study analysis provides support for Boyle's provocative arguments. Yet it also serves to highlight the book's limitations, which are as follows: First, the utility of Boyle's approach rests on the viability of a 2-by-2 table that assumes implicitly that the loss of control and nonacceptance of a settlement by any side produces the same outcome. …
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Parameters Social Sciences-Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
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