代表授权-缺乏理论的规则:重新评估Makate诉Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 (CC)

C. Pretorius
{"title":"代表授权-缺乏理论的规则:重新评估Makate诉Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 (CC)","authors":"C. Pretorius","doi":"10.47348/acta/2021/a11","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 SA (CC) the Constitutional Court had to consider the difficult question whether an agreement to negotiate compensation at a later date for an employee who had invented something for his employer was enforceable, where in the absence of later agreement the issue would be referred to the Chief Executive Officer of the employer for final determination. Although the court answered this in the affirmative, the more pressing issue for present purposes was whether the representative of the employer who had negotiated the agreement with the employee had the necessary actual or apparent authority to conclude the agreement. In dealing with the matter of authority, the apex court took an unconventional approach to ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ authority: Whereas the basis of such authority has traditionally been seen as the doctrine of estoppel, the court held that the expressions ‘apparent authority’ and ‘ostensible authority’ have no bearing on estoppel as such, but rather refer to a form of actual authority arising from a representation of authority by the principal in respect of the agent. This article examines the court’s approach in that regard and concludes that, although the decision attracts criticism from a conceptual viewpoint, there is merit in such an approach if it is adapted and defined purely in terms of the reliance theory.","PeriodicalId":90407,"journal":{"name":"Acta juridica (Cape Town, South Africa)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Authority by representation – a rule lacking a theory: A reappraisal of Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 (CC)\",\"authors\":\"C. Pretorius\",\"doi\":\"10.47348/acta/2021/a11\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 SA (CC) the Constitutional Court had to consider the difficult question whether an agreement to negotiate compensation at a later date for an employee who had invented something for his employer was enforceable, where in the absence of later agreement the issue would be referred to the Chief Executive Officer of the employer for final determination. Although the court answered this in the affirmative, the more pressing issue for present purposes was whether the representative of the employer who had negotiated the agreement with the employee had the necessary actual or apparent authority to conclude the agreement. In dealing with the matter of authority, the apex court took an unconventional approach to ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ authority: Whereas the basis of such authority has traditionally been seen as the doctrine of estoppel, the court held that the expressions ‘apparent authority’ and ‘ostensible authority’ have no bearing on estoppel as such, but rather refer to a form of actual authority arising from a representation of authority by the principal in respect of the agent. This article examines the court’s approach in that regard and concludes that, although the decision attracts criticism from a conceptual viewpoint, there is merit in such an approach if it is adapted and defined purely in terms of the reliance theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":90407,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Acta juridica (Cape Town, South Africa)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Acta juridica (Cape Town, South Africa)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.47348/acta/2021/a11\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Acta juridica (Cape Town, South Africa)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.47348/acta/2021/a11","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 SA (CC)一案中,宪法法院必须考虑一个棘手的问题,即为雇主发明了某种东西的雇员在以后的日期谈判补偿的协议是否具有可执行性,在没有后来的协议的情况下,该问题将提交给雇主的首席执行官进行最终决定。虽然法院对此作了肯定的回答,但就目前而言,更紧迫的问题是,与雇员谈判达成协议的雇主代表是否具有必要的实际或表面授权来达成协议。在处理权威问题时,最高法院对“表面权威”或“表面权威”采取了一种非常规的方法:尽管这种权威的基础传统上被视为禁止反言原则,但法院认为,“表面权威”和“表面权威”的表达与禁止反言本身无关,而是指委托人对代理人的权威代表所产生的一种实际权威形式。本文考察了法院在这方面的做法,并得出结论认为,尽管该决定从概念角度引起了批评,但如果纯粹根据信赖理论对这种做法进行调整和定义,这种做法是有价值的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Authority by representation – a rule lacking a theory: A reappraisal of Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 (CC)
In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 SA (CC) the Constitutional Court had to consider the difficult question whether an agreement to negotiate compensation at a later date for an employee who had invented something for his employer was enforceable, where in the absence of later agreement the issue would be referred to the Chief Executive Officer of the employer for final determination. Although the court answered this in the affirmative, the more pressing issue for present purposes was whether the representative of the employer who had negotiated the agreement with the employee had the necessary actual or apparent authority to conclude the agreement. In dealing with the matter of authority, the apex court took an unconventional approach to ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ authority: Whereas the basis of such authority has traditionally been seen as the doctrine of estoppel, the court held that the expressions ‘apparent authority’ and ‘ostensible authority’ have no bearing on estoppel as such, but rather refer to a form of actual authority arising from a representation of authority by the principal in respect of the agent. This article examines the court’s approach in that regard and concludes that, although the decision attracts criticism from a conceptual viewpoint, there is merit in such an approach if it is adapted and defined purely in terms of the reliance theory.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信