{"title":"奥贝格费尔与基于身份的兵役排斥的尊严损害","authors":"E. Merriam","doi":"10.5070/L3271047872","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Merriam, Eric | Abstract: In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court recognized the right of same-sex couples to be married.[1] In doing so, the Court remedied the demeaning exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from a nationally cherished institution, noting the stigma and injury the exclusion caused. The sweeping language of the majority opinion in Obergefell and its focus on exclusionary harm suggested a new era of inclusion for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans.[2] This Article argues that the exclusion of transgender persons from military service constitutes the type of harm Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit.This Article first provides background on the pre-Obergefell landscape for constitutional challenges to military service exclusion. Second, the Article assesses Obergefell’s jurisprudential expansions of substantive due process and equal protection doctrines through its recognition of the exclusionary harm done to gay people by excluding them from the institution of marriage. The Article uses the Court’s exclusionary harm analysis to assess the exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from another nationally cherished institution: the Trump Administration’s ban on transgender persons serving in the military. Third, the Article argues that Obergefell advanced a new equal protection doctrine: the government may not demean a group by excluding it from an important positive right resulting in dignitary harm. The Article concludes that the transgender military ban constitutes the type of dignitary harm that Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit. [1]. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). [2]. While the opinion did not explicitly address transgender rights, the Court wrote, “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, [including the right] to define and express their identity.” Id. at 2593. Some commentators observed this extended protections to transgender people. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, How Obergefell Could Help Transgender Rights, Slate (June 26, 2015), https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/06/obergefell-and-trans-rights-the-supreme-courts-endorsement-of-identity-expression-could-help-trans-activism.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3W-PVWP]; J. Courtney Sullivan, What Marriage Equality Means for Transgender Rights, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/opinion/what-marriage-equality-means-for-transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-T2NV].","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Obergefell and the Dignitary Harm of Identity-Based Military Service Exclusion\",\"authors\":\"E. Merriam\",\"doi\":\"10.5070/L3271047872\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Author(s): Merriam, Eric | Abstract: In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court recognized the right of same-sex couples to be married.[1] In doing so, the Court remedied the demeaning exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from a nationally cherished institution, noting the stigma and injury the exclusion caused. The sweeping language of the majority opinion in Obergefell and its focus on exclusionary harm suggested a new era of inclusion for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans.[2] This Article argues that the exclusion of transgender persons from military service constitutes the type of harm Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit.This Article first provides background on the pre-Obergefell landscape for constitutional challenges to military service exclusion. Second, the Article assesses Obergefell’s jurisprudential expansions of substantive due process and equal protection doctrines through its recognition of the exclusionary harm done to gay people by excluding them from the institution of marriage. The Article uses the Court’s exclusionary harm analysis to assess the exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from another nationally cherished institution: the Trump Administration’s ban on transgender persons serving in the military. Third, the Article argues that Obergefell advanced a new equal protection doctrine: the government may not demean a group by excluding it from an important positive right resulting in dignitary harm. The Article concludes that the transgender military ban constitutes the type of dignitary harm that Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit. [1]. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). [2]. While the opinion did not explicitly address transgender rights, the Court wrote, “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, [including the right] to define and express their identity.” Id. at 2593. Some commentators observed this extended protections to transgender people. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, How Obergefell Could Help Transgender Rights, Slate (June 26, 2015), https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/06/obergefell-and-trans-rights-the-supreme-courts-endorsement-of-identity-expression-could-help-trans-activism.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3W-PVWP]; J. Courtney Sullivan, What Marriage Equality Means for Transgender Rights, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/opinion/what-marriage-equality-means-for-transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-T2NV].\",\"PeriodicalId\":83388,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"UCLA women's law journal\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"UCLA women's law journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3271047872\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"UCLA women's law journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3271047872","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
摘要:在Obergefell v. Hodges一案中,美国最高法院承认了同性伴侣结婚的权利在这样做时,法院纠正了将历史上处于不利地位的少数群体排除在国家珍视的机构之外的有失尊严的做法,并注意到这种排除所造成的耻辱和伤害。奥贝格费尔案多数意见的广泛措辞及其对排他性伤害的关注表明,美国人进入了一个包容女同性恋、男同性恋、双性恋和变性人的新时代本文认为,排除跨性别者服兵役构成了奥贝格费尔和平等保护条款所禁止的伤害类型。本文首先提供了奥贝格费尔案之前对兵役排除的宪法挑战的背景。其次,该条款通过承认将同性恋者排除在婚姻制度之外对他们造成的排他性伤害,评估了奥贝格费尔对实质性正当程序和平等保护原则的法理扩展。该条使用法院的排他性伤害分析来评估将历史上处于不利地位的少数群体排除在另一个国家珍视的制度之外的情况:特朗普政府禁止跨性别者在军队服役。第三,本文认为奥贝格费尔提出了一种新的平等保护原则:政府不得通过将一个群体排除在一项重要的积极权利之外而贬低该群体,从而导致尊严损害。文章的结论是,跨性别军人禁令构成了奥贝格费尔和平等保护条款所禁止的尊严伤害类型。[1]. Obergefell诉Hodges案,135分院判例,2584,2608(2015)。[2]. 虽然该意见没有明确提到跨性别者的权利,但最高法院写道,“宪法承诺在其范围内给予所有人自由,(包括)定义和表达自己身份的权利。”Id。在2593年。一些评论人士注意到,这种扩大了对跨性别者的保护。参见Scott Skinner-Thompson,《奥贝格费尔如何帮助变性人权利》,Slate(2015年6月26日),https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/06/obergefell-and-trans-rights-the-supreme-courts-endorsement-of-identity-expression-could-help-trans-activism.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3W-PVWP];J. Courtney Sullivan,婚姻平权对跨性别者的意义,《纽约时报》(2015年7月16日),https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/opinion/what-marriage-equality-means-for-transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-T2NV]。
Obergefell and the Dignitary Harm of Identity-Based Military Service Exclusion
Author(s): Merriam, Eric | Abstract: In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court recognized the right of same-sex couples to be married.[1] In doing so, the Court remedied the demeaning exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from a nationally cherished institution, noting the stigma and injury the exclusion caused. The sweeping language of the majority opinion in Obergefell and its focus on exclusionary harm suggested a new era of inclusion for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans.[2] This Article argues that the exclusion of transgender persons from military service constitutes the type of harm Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit.This Article first provides background on the pre-Obergefell landscape for constitutional challenges to military service exclusion. Second, the Article assesses Obergefell’s jurisprudential expansions of substantive due process and equal protection doctrines through its recognition of the exclusionary harm done to gay people by excluding them from the institution of marriage. The Article uses the Court’s exclusionary harm analysis to assess the exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from another nationally cherished institution: the Trump Administration’s ban on transgender persons serving in the military. Third, the Article argues that Obergefell advanced a new equal protection doctrine: the government may not demean a group by excluding it from an important positive right resulting in dignitary harm. The Article concludes that the transgender military ban constitutes the type of dignitary harm that Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit. [1]. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). [2]. While the opinion did not explicitly address transgender rights, the Court wrote, “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, [including the right] to define and express their identity.” Id. at 2593. Some commentators observed this extended protections to transgender people. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, How Obergefell Could Help Transgender Rights, Slate (June 26, 2015), https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/06/obergefell-and-trans-rights-the-supreme-courts-endorsement-of-identity-expression-could-help-trans-activism.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3W-PVWP]; J. Courtney Sullivan, What Marriage Equality Means for Transgender Rights, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/opinion/what-marriage-equality-means-for-transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-T2NV].