私人环境管治

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
M. Vandenbergh
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引用次数: 60

摘要

环境法已悄然从一个深深植根于行政法的实证法领域,转变为一个也深深植根于私法和私人治理的实证法领域。在经历了20年(1970-1990年)的显著活动之后,20多年过去了,却没有出台一项重要的联邦环境法规(1991-2012年)。无论下一步是扩张还是收缩,对联邦法律框架的改革都已停滞不前。联邦监管活动以及州和地方的措施填补了一些空白,但私人治理的努力——通过私人标准、监督、执行和争端解决来追求公共目标——现在发挥着重要作用。公司报告说,他们使用的有毒物质更多地受到私人供应链合同要求的管制,而不是联邦有毒物质法规。全世界14%的温带森林和7%的渔业的命运掌握在私人认证系统手中。花在私人环境检查上的钱比花在整个联邦环境执法办公室上的钱还多。私人治理的出现隐藏在人们的视野中,因为观察环境法的概念模型和衡量法律活动的指标不容易与私人治理相一致。环境偏好是在私人市场决策中表达的,而不是通过投票或游说。标准的制定、执行和争议的解决是通过私人行为和机构进行的,而不是通过立法机关、机构和法院。本文论证了将看似不同的私人活动概念化为一种独立的环境治理新模式的价值。以这种方式看待私人环境治理提供了关于集体行动问题的新见解,重新构建了用于环境工具选择的标准,并提出了解决环境问题的新参与者和行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Private Environmental Governance
Environmental law has quietly transformed from a positive law field deeply rooted in administrative law to one that is also heavily rooted in private law and private governance. After two decades (1970-1990) of remarkable activity, more than two decades have now passed without a major federal environmental statute (1991-2012). Whether the appropriate next step is expansion or contraction, reforms to the federal statutory framework have stalled. Federal regulatory activity and state and local measures have filled some of the gap, but private governance efforts – the pursuit of public ends through private standards, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution – now play an important role. Corporations report that their toxics use is regulated more by private supply chain contract requirements than the federal toxics statute. The fate of 14% of the temperate forests and 7% of the fisheries around the world is in the hands of private certification systems. More money is spent on private environmental inspections than on the entire federal environmental enforcement office. The emergence of private governance is hiding in plain view because the conceptual model by which environmental law is viewed and the metrics by which legal activity is measured do not square easily with private governance. Environmental preferences are expressed in private market decisions, not through voting or lobbying. Standard-setting, enforcement, and dispute resolution occur through private actions and institutions, not legislatures, agencies and courts. This Article demonstrates the value of conceptualizing seemingly disparate private activities as a discrete new model of environmental governance. Viewing private environmental governance in this way provides new insights about collective action problems, re-frames the standards used for environmental instrument choice, and suggests new actors and actions to address environmental problems.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
4.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1915, the Cornell Law Review is a student-run and student-edited journal that strives to publish novel scholarship that will have an immediate and lasting impact on the legal community. The Cornell Law Review publishes six issues annually consisting of articles, essays, book reviews, and student notes.
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