{"title":"数据不符合:这是可靠性的问题","authors":"John H. Heinrichs","doi":"10.3280/EPIS2014-001006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.","PeriodicalId":50506,"journal":{"name":"Epistemologia","volume":"1 1","pages":"96-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The numbers don’t fit: a problem for reliabilism\",\"authors\":\"John H. Heinrichs\",\"doi\":\"10.3280/EPIS2014-001006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.\",\"PeriodicalId\":50506,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Epistemologia\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"96-105\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Epistemologia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3280/EPIS2014-001006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Epistemologia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3280/EPIS2014-001006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.
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