韩国和平基金

Q1 Arts and Humanities
Shepherd Iverson
{"title":"韩国和平基金","authors":"Shepherd Iverson","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.2.62","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their \"heroic\" wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a \"tipping point\" for Korean unification. Tipping points are moments of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them \"moments of truth\" when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector populations, Haggard and Noland assert, \"There is evidence of increasing willingness to defy the government through everyday forms of resistance, such as listening to foreign media.\"5 Information flows are subtly changing perspectives and aspirations throughout North Korea. As personal desperation and the aspirations of a new generation synergize with knowledge of the outside world, more people will realize they are trapped inside a self-limiting political-economic and cultural system and may seek alternatives. With greater access to outside information, the power elite is probably acutely aware of this relative deficiency.This model provides especially strong incentives for the power elite to reassess its options. In every polity, there are internal divisions at the highest levels of power and authority. Disagreements undoubtedly exist among elite power brokers in North Korea as crosscurrent objectives of cabinet, party, and military peer institutions clash. …","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Korean Peace Fund\",\"authors\":\"Shepherd Iverson\",\"doi\":\"10.3172/NKR.8.2.62\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their \\\"heroic\\\" wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a \\\"tipping point\\\" for Korean unification. Tipping points are moments of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them \\\"moments of truth\\\" when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector populations, Haggard and Noland assert, \\\"There is evidence of increasing willingness to defy the government through everyday forms of resistance, such as listening to foreign media.\\\"5 Information flows are subtly changing perspectives and aspirations throughout North Korea. As personal desperation and the aspirations of a new generation synergize with knowledge of the outside world, more people will realize they are trapped inside a self-limiting political-economic and cultural system and may seek alternatives. With greater access to outside information, the power elite is probably acutely aware of this relative deficiency.This model provides especially strong incentives for the power elite to reassess its options. In every polity, there are internal divisions at the highest levels of power and authority. Disagreements undoubtedly exist among elite power brokers in North Korea as crosscurrent objectives of cabinet, party, and military peer institutions clash. …\",\"PeriodicalId\":40013,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"North Korean Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"North Korean Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.62\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"North Korean Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.62","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

据说一切都是出售的。那和平呢?南北韩的和平与统一可以用金钱买到吗?仅仅为和平买单就能避免战争吗?这可能并不像看起来那么牵强。事实上,这是克林顿执政期间美国政府讨论的一个话题如果战争是为了金钱、权力和对产生战争的人民、土地和资源的控制而进行的,为什么我们不能提前付款来防止它呢?我认为我们可以,我将提出一个模型来完成这项任务,建议谁应该支付多少,并建议这笔钱可能来自哪里。为了说服朝鲜领导人解散军队并继续统一,该模式优先考虑三个基本激励因素:(1)私人财富,(2)个人安全和自由,(3)荣誉和声望。除了这种自上而下的办法外,还向军队和一般民众提供自下而上的奖励,认识到妇女和儿童的激励作用以及对家庭安全的自然愿望。也许最重要的是,这种模式可以让朝鲜领导人挽回面子,体面地选择体面地退出目前的困境。2 .韩国和平基金的明确目的是为和平统一创造个人、经济和政治动力。它基于令人信服的个人和经济激励,以及对朝鲜政治领导层和普通朝鲜家庭的同情。我的建议是,向一个普通的朝鲜公民提供相当于多年工作的报酬,公开表彰朝鲜领导人(因为他们下台的“英雄”智慧),用实实在在的私人财富和国际上对他们的人身安全和自由生活和旅行的保证收买他们,以此换取2400万人的忠诚。和平的总代价是可以承受的,当人们考虑到可能的选择是战争时,这是一笔价值不可估量的交易。这种模式为所有朝鲜人提供了巨大的动力,让他们加入到世界其他地区的相对繁荣中来。民众的支持提高了朝韩统一达到“临界点”的可能性。引爆点是达到阈值的敏感时刻,小事情可能会产生巨大的后果。斯托辛格把领导人跨越战争(或和平)门槛的时刻称为“真理时刻”它们会出人意料地出现,改变历史的进程。促进和平的激励模式这一模式的潜在功效被文化传播和目前在朝鲜社交网络上传播的“外面的世界是一个更好的地方”的口口相传所增强。与中国的边界漏洞百出,市场活动增加,增加了外部信息和韩国文化产品的传播哈格德和诺兰分析了来自两大叛逃者群体的数据,断言:“有证据表明,通过日常形式的抵抗,比如收听外国媒体,越来越多的人愿意反抗政府。”信息流正在微妙地改变着整个朝鲜的观点和愿望。随着个人的绝望和新一代的渴望与外部世界的知识协同作用,更多的人将意识到他们被困在一个自我限制的政治经济和文化体系中,并可能寻求替代方案。随着获得外部信息的渠道越来越多,权力精英可能敏锐地意识到这种相对不足。这种模式为权力精英重新评估其选择提供了特别强烈的激励。在每一个政体中,在权力和权威的最高层次上都存在内部分歧。毫无疑问,朝鲜精英权力掮客之间存在分歧,因为内阁、政党和军方对等机构的目标相互冲突。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Korean Peace Fund
IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their "heroic" wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a "tipping point" for Korean unification. Tipping points are moments of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them "moments of truth" when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector populations, Haggard and Noland assert, "There is evidence of increasing willingness to defy the government through everyday forms of resistance, such as listening to foreign media."5 Information flows are subtly changing perspectives and aspirations throughout North Korea. As personal desperation and the aspirations of a new generation synergize with knowledge of the outside world, more people will realize they are trapped inside a self-limiting political-economic and cultural system and may seek alternatives. With greater access to outside information, the power elite is probably acutely aware of this relative deficiency.This model provides especially strong incentives for the power elite to reassess its options. In every polity, there are internal divisions at the highest levels of power and authority. Disagreements undoubtedly exist among elite power brokers in North Korea as crosscurrent objectives of cabinet, party, and military peer institutions clash. …
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信