moting:单侧的moting

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Scott MacGuidwin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

有几种情况会导致案件没有实际意义。这些包括和解协议、当事人串通、诉讼身份的改变,以及阻碍法院给予任何救济的外在情况。最后一个原因是单方面的不确定性——当被告违背原告的意愿结束诉讼,给予原告所要求的一切。在实践中,这允许被告在明显不会赢的情况下策略性地停止诉讼。通过这样做,他们防止法院做出不利的先例,并保留了从事类似行为而不受惩罚的机会。法院已经建立了一系列的情绪例外来限制这种游戏。这些例外是基于模糊的标准,这对指导法官做出有意义的决定几乎没有帮助。结果是,一些案件是根据案情审理的,而另一些几乎相同的案件则被驳回。单边情绪作为审慎原则是失败的。它努力限制不同的结果,防止被告耍花招,或节省司法资源,而替代解决方案并不能完全解决这三个问题。本文认为,最好的解决办法是完全放弃单边情绪。除非达成和解、共谋或无法获得救济,否则法官绝不应将案件视为没有实际意义而不予受理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mooting Unilateral Mootness
Several situations cause a case to be moot. These include settlement agreements, party collusion, changes in litigant status, and extrinsic circumstances thwarting the court from granting any relief. The final reason is unilateral mootness—when a defendant ends a lawsuit against a plaintiff’s wishes by giving them everything for which they ask. In practice, this allows defendants to strategically stop lawsuits when it is clear they are not going to win. By doing so, they prevent the court from handing down adverse precedent and preserve the opportunity to engage in similar behavior with impunity. Courts have established a series of mootness exceptions to limit such gamesmanship. These exceptions are based on vague standards, which do little to guide judges making mootness decisions. The result is that some cases are heard on the merits, while other, nearly identical ones are dismissed. Unilateral mootness fails as a prudential doctrine. It struggles to limit disparate outcomes, prevent defendant gamesmanship, or save judicial resources, and alternative solutions do not fully address these three problems. This Note argues that the best recourse is to scrap unilateral mootness completely. Barring a settlement, collusion, or impossibility of relief, judges should never dismiss a case as moot.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: The Michigan Law Review is a journal of legal scholarship. Eight issues are published annually. Seven of each volume"s eight issues ordinarily are composed of two major parts: Articles by legal scholars and practitioners, and Notes written by the student editors. One issue in each volume is devoted to book reviews. Occasionally, special issues are devoted to symposia or colloquia. First Impressions, the online companion to the Michigan Law Review, publishes op-ed length articles by academics, judges, and practitioners on current legal issues. This extension of the printed journal facilitates quick dissemination of the legal community’s initial impressions of important judicial decisions, legislative developments, and timely legal policy issues.
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