信息应该由财产规则还是责任规则来管理

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Mark A. Lemley, P. Weiser
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引用次数: 80

摘要

本文关注的是技术法律背景下关于财产规则的争论中一个未被重视的重要方面。它特别指出,受财产规则保护的法定权利- -即获得禁令救济的权利- -的经典理由取决于有效界定和执行财产权的能力。在许多技术市场的情况下,无法调整禁令救济,使其仅保护基本权利,而不是同时禁止非侵权行为,这为使用责任规则(即向原告判给相关损害赔偿)而不是财产规则提供了强有力的基础。值得注意的是,在禁令救济不能仅限于保护基本权利的情况下,这种救济的可用性可能会导致“拖延策略”,即公司威胁或使用诉讼来获得远远超过其遭受的任何损害的和解。正如文章所解释的那样,这种策略出现在各种技术法律背景下,包括专利法、数字版权案件和频谱监管。根据情况的具体情况,法院或机构应监督有关的责任制度,在某些情况下,行政方面的质疑可能根本破坏责任规则的理由。不幸的是,法律学者一般都把重点放在关于产权适当范围的实质性辩论上- -往往主张要么全有要么全无的解决办法- -而忽略了对法院或机构是否以及何时可以监督责任制度而不是产权的制度考虑的评价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information
This Article focuses on an unappreciated and significant aspect of the debate over property rules in the technology law context. In particular, it argues that the classic justification for legal entitlements protected by a property rule - i.e., a right to injunctive relief - depends on the ability to define and enforce property rights effectively. In the case of many technology markets, the inability to tailor injunctive relief so that it protects only the underlying right rather than also enjoining noninfringing conduct provides a powerful basis for using a liability rule (i.e., awarding the relevant damages to the plaintiff) instead of a property rule. Notably, where injunctive relief cannot be confined to protecting the underlying right, the availability of such relief can give rise to a "holdup strategy," whereby a firm threatens or uses litigation to obtain a settlement significantly in excess of any harm it suffers. Such strategies, as the Article explains, arise in a variety of technology law contexts, including patent law, digital copyright cases, and spectrum regulation. Depending on the particulars of the context, either courts or agencies should superintend the relevant liability regime and, in some cases, the administrative challenges may undermine the case for a liability rule at all. Unfortunately, legal scholars have generally focused on the substantive debate as to the proper scope of property rights - often arguing for an all or nothing solution - at the expense of evaluating the institutional considerations as to whether and when courts or agencies can superintend a liability regime in lieu of a property right.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
6.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Texas Law Review is a national and international leader in legal scholarship. Texas Law Review is an independent journal, edited and published entirely by students at the University of Texas School of Law. Our seven issues per year contain articles by professors, judges, and practitioners; reviews of important recent books from recognized experts, essays, commentaries; and student written notes. Texas Law Review is currently the ninth most cited legal periodical in federal and state cases in the United States and the thirteenth most cited by legal journals.
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