盈余管理与投资者反应

IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
M. Salehi, Amir Malekinejad, M. Abbaszadeh
{"title":"盈余管理与投资者反应","authors":"M. Salehi, Amir Malekinejad, M. Abbaszadeh","doi":"10.32910/ep.73.4.6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the article is to investigate the contraction between the behavior of managers and investors toward Iran's capital market and the focus on agency theory which ends up with the conflict between the utilities of manages and investors because a conflict of interest implies an attempt to spread opportunistic behavior. In the current study, the benefit of reducing capital cost (manager's utility) and return on assets (investor's utility) are considered variables of interest of either party, in that Osborne's game theory was used in a two-step manner. The study population consisted of the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Iran Over-the-Counter Market, classified in the game table according to managers' behavior toward high or low earnings management and investor's behavior toward acceptance non-acceptance of stock. The experimental results presented in this paper uphold the agency theory, indicating a conflict between managers and investors in Iran's capital market, particularly in the Tehran Stock Exchange. According to game theory, Nash's dominant equilibrium comes to the fore when dealing with the manager's low earnings management and investor's choice of strategy to accept a share in Iran's capital market and Tehran Stock Exchange. Alternatively, the presentation of transparent financial statements and the acceptance of such a company stock can maximize parties' utilities.","PeriodicalId":53985,"journal":{"name":"Ekonomski Pregled","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Earnings management and investor reaction\",\"authors\":\"M. Salehi, Amir Malekinejad, M. Abbaszadeh\",\"doi\":\"10.32910/ep.73.4.6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The purpose of the article is to investigate the contraction between the behavior of managers and investors toward Iran's capital market and the focus on agency theory which ends up with the conflict between the utilities of manages and investors because a conflict of interest implies an attempt to spread opportunistic behavior. In the current study, the benefit of reducing capital cost (manager's utility) and return on assets (investor's utility) are considered variables of interest of either party, in that Osborne's game theory was used in a two-step manner. The study population consisted of the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Iran Over-the-Counter Market, classified in the game table according to managers' behavior toward high or low earnings management and investor's behavior toward acceptance non-acceptance of stock. The experimental results presented in this paper uphold the agency theory, indicating a conflict between managers and investors in Iran's capital market, particularly in the Tehran Stock Exchange. According to game theory, Nash's dominant equilibrium comes to the fore when dealing with the manager's low earnings management and investor's choice of strategy to accept a share in Iran's capital market and Tehran Stock Exchange. Alternatively, the presentation of transparent financial statements and the acceptance of such a company stock can maximize parties' utilities.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53985,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ekonomski Pregled\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ekonomski Pregled\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.32910/ep.73.4.6\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ekonomski Pregled","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.32910/ep.73.4.6","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

本文的目的是研究管理者和投资者对伊朗资本市场行为的收缩,以及对代理理论的关注,代理理论最终导致管理者和投资者的效用之间的冲突,因为利益冲突意味着试图传播机会主义行为。在本研究中,降低资本成本的收益(管理者的效用)和资产回报(投资者的效用)被认为是双方利益的变量,Osborne的博弈论以两步的方式使用。研究人群包括在德黑兰证券交易所和伊朗场外交易市场上市的公司,根据管理者对高收益管理或低收益管理的行为和投资者对接受不接受股票的行为在游戏表中进行分类。本文的实验结果支持代理理论,表明伊朗资本市场,特别是德黑兰证券交易所的管理者和投资者之间存在冲突。根据博弈论,在处理管理者的低收益管理和投资者在伊朗资本市场和德黑兰证券交易所接受股票的策略选择时,纳什的优势均衡表现出来。或者,提交透明的财务报表和接受这样的公司股票可以最大化各方的效用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Earnings management and investor reaction
The purpose of the article is to investigate the contraction between the behavior of managers and investors toward Iran's capital market and the focus on agency theory which ends up with the conflict between the utilities of manages and investors because a conflict of interest implies an attempt to spread opportunistic behavior. In the current study, the benefit of reducing capital cost (manager's utility) and return on assets (investor's utility) are considered variables of interest of either party, in that Osborne's game theory was used in a two-step manner. The study population consisted of the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Iran Over-the-Counter Market, classified in the game table according to managers' behavior toward high or low earnings management and investor's behavior toward acceptance non-acceptance of stock. The experimental results presented in this paper uphold the agency theory, indicating a conflict between managers and investors in Iran's capital market, particularly in the Tehran Stock Exchange. According to game theory, Nash's dominant equilibrium comes to the fore when dealing with the manager's low earnings management and investor's choice of strategy to accept a share in Iran's capital market and Tehran Stock Exchange. Alternatively, the presentation of transparent financial statements and the acceptance of such a company stock can maximize parties' utilities.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Ekonomski Pregled
Ekonomski Pregled ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信