{"title":"除了执法研究","authors":"Žaklina Harašić","doi":"10.25234/pv/24920","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One of the goals of this work is to point out the efforts of modern studies on the sources of law to reduce the traditional sources of law - material, ethical, formal and cognitive - to formal sources of law. It is argued that the concept of the source of law, which includes the mentioned types and the phenomena they contain, is too broad, and that these phenomena have only the fact that legal norms spring from them. Here, in our opinion, the problem arises as to how to consider the phenomena from which law undoubtedly arises, especially those that fall under the material and ethical types. The problem can be solved by calling material sources legal relations, and ethical sources legal values. In addition, there is another problem that many (formal) sources also have some material and/or ethical characteristics. Likewise, we pointed out the connection between legal sources and arguments, meaning by arguments regulations and what are usually considered arguments (a. a contrario, a. a simile ad simili, a. a fortiori). We proposed a possible list of legal sources, where the main problem is that, in compiling it, it is not possible to apply one (same) criterion.","PeriodicalId":41100,"journal":{"name":"Pravni Vjesnik","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"DOPRINOS UČENJIMA O PRAVNIM IZVORIMA\",\"authors\":\"Žaklina Harašić\",\"doi\":\"10.25234/pv/24920\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One of the goals of this work is to point out the efforts of modern studies on the sources of law to reduce the traditional sources of law - material, ethical, formal and cognitive - to formal sources of law. It is argued that the concept of the source of law, which includes the mentioned types and the phenomena they contain, is too broad, and that these phenomena have only the fact that legal norms spring from them. Here, in our opinion, the problem arises as to how to consider the phenomena from which law undoubtedly arises, especially those that fall under the material and ethical types. The problem can be solved by calling material sources legal relations, and ethical sources legal values. In addition, there is another problem that many (formal) sources also have some material and/or ethical characteristics. Likewise, we pointed out the connection between legal sources and arguments, meaning by arguments regulations and what are usually considered arguments (a. a contrario, a. a simile ad simili, a. a fortiori). We proposed a possible list of legal sources, where the main problem is that, in compiling it, it is not possible to apply one (same) criterion.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41100,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Pravni Vjesnik\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Pravni Vjesnik\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.25234/pv/24920\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Pravni Vjesnik","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25234/pv/24920","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the goals of this work is to point out the efforts of modern studies on the sources of law to reduce the traditional sources of law - material, ethical, formal and cognitive - to formal sources of law. It is argued that the concept of the source of law, which includes the mentioned types and the phenomena they contain, is too broad, and that these phenomena have only the fact that legal norms spring from them. Here, in our opinion, the problem arises as to how to consider the phenomena from which law undoubtedly arises, especially those that fall under the material and ethical types. The problem can be solved by calling material sources legal relations, and ethical sources legal values. In addition, there is another problem that many (formal) sources also have some material and/or ethical characteristics. Likewise, we pointed out the connection between legal sources and arguments, meaning by arguments regulations and what are usually considered arguments (a. a contrario, a. a simile ad simili, a. a fortiori). We proposed a possible list of legal sources, where the main problem is that, in compiling it, it is not possible to apply one (same) criterion.