{"title":"痛苦奖:我们侵权制度的非理性中心","authors":"Paul v. Niemeyer","doi":"10.2307/3202381","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"HEN a petit jury in a civil tort action awards damages for pain and suffering, it does not award damages that compensate, or that indemnify, or that provide restitution to the injured party—the traditional functions of damage awards. Damages that are awarded for pain and suffering are probably intended as a pecuniary bonus or gift in an amount thought roughly to reference the pain suffered or expected to be suffered. But there seem to be no rational, predictable criteria for measuring these damages. For that reason, there are also no criteria for reviewing pain and suffering awards by the presiding judge or by an appellate court. Without rational criteria for measuring damages for pain and suffering, awarding such damages undermines the tort law’s rationality and predictability—two essential values of the rule of law. Yet it is this irrationality in awarding money for pain and suffering that provides the grist for the mill of our tort industry, which is now estimated to have grown to $200 billion. It is difficult to dismiss an industry of this size as a small pocket of tolerable irrationality when it exceeds the entire economy of Turkey, or Austria, or Denmark.","PeriodicalId":47840,"journal":{"name":"Virginia Law Review","volume":"90 1","pages":"1401"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/3202381","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System\",\"authors\":\"Paul v. Niemeyer\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/3202381\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"HEN a petit jury in a civil tort action awards damages for pain and suffering, it does not award damages that compensate, or that indemnify, or that provide restitution to the injured party—the traditional functions of damage awards. Damages that are awarded for pain and suffering are probably intended as a pecuniary bonus or gift in an amount thought roughly to reference the pain suffered or expected to be suffered. But there seem to be no rational, predictable criteria for measuring these damages. For that reason, there are also no criteria for reviewing pain and suffering awards by the presiding judge or by an appellate court. Without rational criteria for measuring damages for pain and suffering, awarding such damages undermines the tort law’s rationality and predictability—two essential values of the rule of law. Yet it is this irrationality in awarding money for pain and suffering that provides the grist for the mill of our tort industry, which is now estimated to have grown to $200 billion. It is difficult to dismiss an industry of this size as a small pocket of tolerable irrationality when it exceeds the entire economy of Turkey, or Austria, or Denmark.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47840,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Virginia Law Review\",\"volume\":\"90 1\",\"pages\":\"1401\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/3202381\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Virginia Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/3202381\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Virginia Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3202381","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System
HEN a petit jury in a civil tort action awards damages for pain and suffering, it does not award damages that compensate, or that indemnify, or that provide restitution to the injured party—the traditional functions of damage awards. Damages that are awarded for pain and suffering are probably intended as a pecuniary bonus or gift in an amount thought roughly to reference the pain suffered or expected to be suffered. But there seem to be no rational, predictable criteria for measuring these damages. For that reason, there are also no criteria for reviewing pain and suffering awards by the presiding judge or by an appellate court. Without rational criteria for measuring damages for pain and suffering, awarding such damages undermines the tort law’s rationality and predictability—two essential values of the rule of law. Yet it is this irrationality in awarding money for pain and suffering that provides the grist for the mill of our tort industry, which is now estimated to have grown to $200 billion. It is difficult to dismiss an industry of this size as a small pocket of tolerable irrationality when it exceeds the entire economy of Turkey, or Austria, or Denmark.
期刊介绍:
The Virginia Law Review is a journal of general legal scholarship published by the students of the University of Virginia School of Law. The continuing objective of the Virginia Law Review is to publish a professional periodical devoted to legal and law-related issues that can be of use to judges, practitioners, teachers, legislators, students, and others interested in the law. First formally organized on April 23, 1913, the Virginia Law Review today remains one of the most respected and influential student legal periodicals in the country.