首席执行官/首席财务官辞职和市场对违反《反海外腐败法》的反应

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of International Accounting Research Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI:10.2308/JIAR-52363

Jui-Chin Chang

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引用次数: 3

摘要

我研究了首席执行官和首席财务官在违反《反海外腐败法》(FCPA)后被迫辞职的情况。我的研究结果表明，遵守《反海外腐败法》的公司(FCPA公司)会在ceo和cfo违规后对他们进行惩戒。此外，在美国证券交易委员会认定首席执行官和首席财务官是这些违规行为的实施者后，他们很可能会辞职，而且美国证券交易委员会禁止的会计欺诈公司(欺诈公司)的首席执行官和首席财务官比FCPA公司的首席执行官和首席财务官更多。此外，首席执行官在辞职后五年内找到新职位的人数少于首席财务官。此外，市场对FCPA公司的贿赂违规公告反应明显，但对其首席执行官或首席财务官的8-K辞职没有反应。相比之下，对于舞弊公司的会计舞弊公告和ceo或cfo的8-K辞职的反应幅度高于FCPA公司。JEL分类:M41;M48;G34;八国。数据可用性:数据可从文本中指出的来源获得。

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CEO/CFO Resignations and the Market's Reaction to Violations of the Foreign Corruption Practices Act

I examine CEOs' and CFOs' forced resignations after violations of the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA). My findings show that firms that adhere to the FCPA (FCPA firms) discipline CEOs and CFOs after violations of the act. Further, CEOs and CFOs are likely to resign after the SEC identifies them as perpetrators in these violations, and the SEC bars more CEOs and CFOs of firms that commit accounting fraud (FRAUD firms) than those of FCPA firms. Also, fewer CEOs than CFOs find a new position within five years after their resignation. Further, the market reacts significantly to the FCPA firms' announcements of bribery violations but does not react to the 8-K resignations of their CEOs or CFOs. In comparison, the magnitudes of the reactions to FRAUD firms' announcements of accounting fraud and the CEOs' or CFOs' 8-K resignations are higher than those of FCPA firms. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G34; G14. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources indicated in the text.

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来源期刊

Journal of International Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

16.70%

发文量