争夺人民的喜爱:联邦制被遗忘的市场

IF 2.4 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
T. E. Pettys
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引用次数: 18

摘要

美国最高法院已经开始以各种有争议的方式重塑联邦制的架构,但未能揭示其运作的蓝图。在许多批评人士看来,最高法院最近就《商业条款》(Commerce Clause)、“征用”(commandeering)和各州主权豁免做出的裁决,只是因为一种意识形态上的愿望,即剥夺联邦政府的权力,赋予各州一种朦胧的尊严光环。本文认为,最高法院正在逐渐接近一种有希望的联邦制理论,这是最高法院及其批评者似乎都没有意识到的。回到《联邦党人文集》中被遗忘的主题,这篇文章认为,州政府和联邦政府相互竞争,以获得公民的“喜爱”,并争夺经常伴随这种喜爱而来的监管权力。该条进一步认为,公民和政治家只有在满足三个先决条件的情况下才能充分参与这个由情感驱动的市场:必须保证每个君主都有机会展示自己的能力;每个主权国家都必须享有相当程度的独立于对方的自主权;两国政府之间的交易必须足够透明,以使公民能够以准确的方式分配赞扬和指责。该条接着指出,尽管最高法院没有以这种方式来描述其联邦制裁决,尽管人们可能会质疑司法机构最终是否有能力在维护市场活力方面发挥持续的突出作用,但最高法院似乎决心确保满足这三个市场要求。文章最后敦促法院和学者考虑如何才能最好地维护市场的健康,以及广泛的法律理论和立法实践如何阻碍或促进两个主权国家之间被遗忘的联邦主义竞争目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace
The United States Supreme Court has begun to reshape the architecture of federalism in a variety of controversial ways but has failed to reveal much about the blueprint with which it is working. In the eyes of many critics, the Court's recent rulings regarding the Commerce Clause, "commandeering," and the states' sovereign immunity are united only by an ideological desire to strip power from the federal government and confer upon the states a hazy aura of dignity. This Article contends that the Court is edging closer to a promising theory of federalism than either the Court or its critics seem to realize. Returning to forgotten themes in the Federalist Papers, the Article argues that the state and federal governments compete with one another for the "affection" of their citizens and for the regulatory power that often accompanies that affection. The Article further contends that citizens and politicians are able fully to participate in this affection-driven marketplace only if three prerequisites are met: each sovereign must be assured of an opportunity to demonstrate its competence; each sovereign must enjoy a significant measure of autonomy from the other; and the two sovereigns' dealings with one another must be sufficiently transparent to enable citizens to allocate praise and blame in an accurate fashion. The Article then argues that, although the Court has not characterized its federalism rulings in this way, and although one may question whether the judiciary is ultimately competent to play an ongoing, prominent role in preserving the marketplace's vitality, the Court appears determined to ensure that these three market requirements are satisfied. The Article concludes by urging courts and scholars to consider the ways in which the marketplace's health may best be preserved and the ways in which a broad range of legal doctrines and lawmaking practices frustrate or advance federalism's forgotten objective of competition between the two sovereigns.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc is an online forum designed to advance scholarly discussion. En Banc offers professors, practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law Review. En Banc permits extended discussion of our articles in a way that maintains academic integrity and provides authors with a quicker approach to publication. When reexamining a case “en banc” an appellate court operates at its highest level, with all judges present and participating “on the bench.” We chose the name “En Banc” to capture this spirit of focused review and provide a forum for further dialogue where all can be present and participate.
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