纵向限制与知识产权法:超越反垄断法

IF 3 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
M. Meurer
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引用次数: 8

摘要

本文描述了知识产权法如何规范六种类型的垂直限制:对使用领域或地点的限制;共享限制;控制使用频率;修理和改装的限制;包装要求;以及买方决定退出与卖方关系的障碍。将垂直限制的知识产权监管与反垄断监管分开关注有三个原因。首先,知识产权法涵盖了更广泛的纵向限制。其次,反垄断与知识产权冲突的经济分析主要集中在纵向限制排除下游竞争者的潜力上。规范垂直限制的知识产权理论引发了额外的政策问题,包括知识产权法是否应该帮助卖方控制:耐用品的经济寿命;分享版权作品和专利技术;破坏价格歧视的套利行为;或者买方的退出决定。第三,由于知识产权法使用不同的政策工具,它可能对垂直限制提供更有效的监管,并应用于补充反垄断监管。不鼓励垂直限制的知识产权理论通常比具有类似效果的反垄断理论造成的寻租问题要小。提供背景权利的知识产权规则相对于需要不确定推理规则分析的反垄断规则而言是相对明确的。此外,通过抢占或滥用实施的知识产权禁令不会造成三重损害,只能用于防御。相比之下,由于不确定性、三倍损害赔偿的诱惑以及对弱势被告发起机会主义或反竞争诉讼的可能性,对垂直限制的广泛反垄断监管造成了机会主义诉讼的威胁。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust
This Article describes how intellectual property (IP) law regulates six types of vertical restraints: restrictions on the field or location of use; restrictions on sharing; control over the frequency of use; restrictions on repair and modification; packaging requirements; and impediments to a buyer's decision to exit its relationship with a seller. There are three reasons to focus on IP oversight of vertical restraints separately from antitrust oversight. First, IP law covers a broader range of vertical restraints. Second, economic analysis of the antitrust-IP conflict focuses mainly on the potential of vertical restraints to exclude downstream competitors. IP doctrines that regulate vertical restraints raise additional policy concerns including whether IP law should aid a seller's attempt to control: the economic life of a durable good; sharing of copyrighted works and patented technology; arbitrage that undermines price discrimination; or a buyer's exit decision. Third, because IP law uses different policy instruments it possibly offers more effective regulation of vertical restraints, and should be used to complement antitrust regulation. IP doctrines that discourage vertical restraints generally cause smaller rent-seeking problems than antitrust doctrines with a similar effect. IP rules that provide background entitlements are relatively clear compared to antitrust rules which require uncertain rule of reason analysis. Furthermore, IP prohibitions that are implemented through preemption or misuse do not give rise to treble damages, and can only be used defensively. In contrast, broad antitrust regulation of vertical restraints creates a threat of opportunistic suits because of uncertainty, the lure of treble damages, and the possibility of initiating an opportunistic or anti-competitive suit against a vulnerable defendant.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: In January 1917, Professor Henry J. Fletcher launched the Minnesota Law Review with lofty aspirations: “A well-conducted law review . . . ought to do something to develop the spirit of statesmanship as distinguished from a dry professionalism. It ought at the same time contribute a little something to the systematic growth of the whole law.” For the next forty years, in conjunction with the Minnesota State Bar Association, the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School directed the work of student editors of the Law Review. Despite their initial oversight and vision, however, the faculty gradually handed the editorial mantle over to law students.
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