诚实和不透明的管理交易

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
R. Wright, M. Miller
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引用次数: 15

摘要

在“筛选与辩诉交易:我们到底在交易什么?”(即将出版,斯坦福法律评论)Gerard Lynch法官评论“筛选/讨价还价的权衡”,55 Stan。L. Rev. 29(2002),他认为辩诉交易可能对检察官和整个系统都有好处,而积极的检察官筛选不当地削弱了辩护律师的作用,至少在我们所描述的系统中是这样。在他看来,大多数辩诉谈判“主要是讨论案件的案情,其中辩护律师指出检察官案件的法律、证据或实际弱点,或罪犯值得宽大处理的减轻情节,并根据这些考虑主张被告有权得到比检察官最初提出的指控更宽大的处理。”在这一回应中,我们与林奇法官在指控议价的优点和辩护律师在这些谈判中增加价值的力量方面分道扬镳。根据我们对新奥尔良的案例筛选实践的研究,我们认为普遍的伤害源于收费讨价还价,因为它们特别缺乏透明度。收费讨价还价,甚至比量刑让步更让人难以在事后以准确或系统的方式区分交易的好坏。我们认为即使是最好的辩护律师的积极参与也不能解决这个问题。此外,我们认为林奇参与辩护的形象不可能与大多数州和地方司法管辖区的经验一致,包括新奥尔良。选择何种刑事司法行政制度关系重大。检察官有充分的理由想要一个依靠谈判来减轻指控的制度。这样的制度使检察官拥有压倒性的权力和自由裁量权,公众几乎没有机会监督最终产品的质量。当一名检察官选择采用一种限制其自由裁量权并允许公众对其决策进行更大监督的制度时,就像新奥尔良地区检察官所做的那样,这是一个值得欢呼的理由。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains
In "Screening versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?," (forthcoming, Stanford Law Review) Judge Gerard Lynch critiques "The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff," 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (2002), by suggesting that plea bargaining may have virtues for prosecutors and for the entire system, and that aggressive prosecutorial screening unduly diminishes the role of defense counsel, at least in the system we have described. In his view, most plea negotiations "are primarily discussions of the merits of the case, in which defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary or practical weaknesses of the prosecutor's case, or mitigating circumstances of the offender meriting mercy, and argue based on these considerations that the defendant is entitled to a more lenient disposition than that originally proposed by the prosecutor's charge." In this response, we part ways with Judge Lynch on both the virtues of charge bargaining and the power of defense counsel to add value during those negotiations. Based on our study of case screening practices in New Orleans, we believe that pervasive harm stems from charge bargains due to their special lack of transparency. Charge bargains, even more than sentencing concessions, make it difficult after the fact to sort out good bargains from bad in an accurate or systematic way. We do not believe that active participation by even the best defense counsel can solve this problem. Further, we believe that Lynch's image of defense participation is impossible to align with the experience in most state and local jurisdictions, including New Orleans. It matters a great deal which administrative system of criminal justice one chooses. Prosecutors have every reason to want a system that depends on negotiations for reduced charges. Such a system leaves prosecutors with overwhelming authority and discretion, and gives the public little opportunity to monitor the quality of the end product. When a prosecutor chooses to adopt a system that limits his discretion and that allows greater public scrutiny of his decisionmaking, as the New Orleans District Attorney has done, this is a reason to cheer.
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CiteScore
4.80
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2.00%
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