{"title":"正义直觉的测试:如何和为什么?","authors":"P. Robinson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.381420","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Part I of this Article summarizes the arguments as to why lay intuitions of justice are important for criminal law rule-makers. Part II sketches the challenges at reliably determining those intuitions and describes methodology worked out to meet those challenges. Part III looks briefly at one simple study to illustrate the methodology, which has been used on a wide variety of issues, as described in Part IV.","PeriodicalId":81461,"journal":{"name":"Hofstra law review","volume":"28 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Testing Lay Intuitions of Justice: How and Why?\",\"authors\":\"P. Robinson\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.381420\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Part I of this Article summarizes the arguments as to why lay intuitions of justice are important for criminal law rule-makers. Part II sketches the challenges at reliably determining those intuitions and describes methodology worked out to meet those challenges. Part III looks briefly at one simple study to illustrate the methodology, which has been used on a wide variety of issues, as described in Part IV.\",\"PeriodicalId\":81461,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hofstra law review\",\"volume\":\"28 1\",\"pages\":\"2\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-05-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hofstra law review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.381420\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hofstra law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.381420","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Part I of this Article summarizes the arguments as to why lay intuitions of justice are important for criminal law rule-makers. Part II sketches the challenges at reliably determining those intuitions and describes methodology worked out to meet those challenges. Part III looks briefly at one simple study to illustrate the methodology, which has been used on a wide variety of issues, as described in Part IV.
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