产品创新的竞争性进入和价格反应

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting

Review of Marketing Science Pub Date : 2003-08-07 DOI:10.2202/1546-5616.1001

B. Bayus, Pradeep K. Chintagunta

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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文主要研究产品创新的竞争反应。我们考虑“防御者”(拥有第一代产品的企业)和“攻击者”(拥有第二代产品的企业)之间的动态互动。分析了卫士公司的第二代产品进入决策，以及两家公司的定价决策。通过建立一个3期定价博弈模型，研究纳什均衡的闭环策略，得到了分析结果。这些结果使我们能够确定攻击者可以阻止(或延迟)防御者竞争性反应的策略。对于我们的分析结果，一些实证支持也由半导体和个人计算机行业的连续产品世代引入的定价数据和信息提供。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Competitive Entry and Pricing Responses to Product Innovation

In this paper, we study competitive response to a product innovation. We consider the dynamic interaction between a Defender (a firm with a first generation product) and an Attacker (a firm with a second generation product). The second generation product entry decision of the Defender, as well as the pricing decisions of both firms, are analyzed. Analytical results are derived by developing a 3-period pricing game, and studying closed-loop policies for a Nash equilibrium. These results allow us to identify strategies in which the Attacker can prevent (or delay) a competitive response by the Defender. Some empirical support for our analytical results is also provided by pricing data and information on the timing of successive product generation introductions in the semiconductor and personal computer industries.

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来源期刊

Review of Marketing Science Business, Management and Accounting-Marketing

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Marketing Science (ROMS) is a peer-reviewed electronic-only journal whose mission is twofold: wide and rapid dissemination of the latest research in marketing, and one-stop review of important marketing research across the field, past and present. Unlike most marketing journals, ROMS is able to publish peer-reviewed articles immediately thanks to its electronic format. Electronic publication is designed to ensure speedy publication. It works in a very novel and simple way. An issue of ROMS opens and then closes after a year. All papers accepted during the year are part of the issue, and appear as soon as they are accepted. Combined with the rapid peer review process, this makes for quick dissemination.