总统权力交接

IF 1.6 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Beermann
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引用次数: 5

摘要

总统更迭长期以来一直引发争议。无论是“午夜法官”还是“午夜规定”,总统在任期结束时的行动长期以来都引发了审查和批评。总统在任期开始时维护自己的权威,试图消除前任留下的东西,也会引起人们的不满。不止一位总统针对“午夜法规”采取过行动,比如下令冻结新法规的发布,对上届政府结束时发布的法规进行审查,以及其他类似的行动。本文着眼于“午夜管制”的合法性和适当性,以及即将上任的总统用来废除前任留下的“午夜管制”的手段。本文还探讨了总统和行政行为在任期结束时倾向于增加的原因,以及后期行动倾向于采取的形式。我们看到,有时,后期行动只是试图在就职日规定的最后期限之前完成更多工作的一部分,而在其他情况下,延迟可能是由于外部力量或由于政治原因故意等待。应该引起最大关注的后期行动,可能是那些看起来仅仅是为了束缚新一届政府的手脚或制造政治成本的行动,而没有多大希望真正将即将卸任的政府的政策预测到未来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Presidential Power in Transitions
The transition between presidencies has long created controversies. Whether the issue is "midnight judges" or "midnight regulations," presidential action at the end of a term has long provoked scrutiny and criticism. Presidents have also raised eyebrows at the beginning of their terms when they assert their authority and try to undo what their predecessor in office left behind. More than one president has taken action aimed specifically at "midnight regulations," such as ordering a freeze on the issuance of new regulations, a review of regulations issued at the end of the prior administration and other similar action. This article looks at the legality and propriety of "midnight regulation" and the devices incoming presidents use to undo "midnight regulation" left behind by their predecessors in office. The article also looks at the reasons why presidential and administrative action tends to increase at the end of a term and the forms that late term action tend to take. We see that sometimes late term action is simply part of an attempt to get more done before the deadline imposed by inauguration day, while in other situations delay may be due to external forces or due to intentional waiting for political reasons. Late term action that should be the greatest cause for concern may be action that appears designed merely to tie the hands of an incoming administration or create political costs without much hope of genuinely projecting the outgoing administration's policies into the future.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
5.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Boston University Law Review provides analysis and commentary on all areas of the law. Published six times a year, the Law Review contains articles contributed by law professors and practicing attorneys from all over the world, along with notes written by student members.
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