单向度联邦制:商业条款裁决的权力与视角

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
R. Schapiro, William W. Buzbee
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引用次数: 4

摘要

自1995年以来,美国最高法院在评估《商业条款》的宪法限制时,采用了一种新的严格司法审查形式。长期以来,《商业条款》一直是国会权力的中央授权。正如法官席内外的批评者所指出的那样,最高法院通过要求受管制的活动本身具有经济或商业性质来推进其联邦制的概念。法院的处理方法中受到较少注意的一个关键方面是选择有关活动进行宪法分析的前一个步骤。立法可以从各种不同的角度来看待,选择有利位置对于确定必要的商业关系至关重要。在新政之后,法院支持立法,如果它有商业联系,从任何角度来看。本文认为,与半个世纪以来的既定判例不同,最高法院最近坚持选择单一视角作为决定性观点。这种方法,我们称之为“单向度”,将大量的自由裁量权从国会转移到司法部门。根据最近关于法定解释的学术见解,我们阐明了法院单一性方法的缺陷。立法包含多种动机、目标、受益人和效果。法院挑选出一个因素作为决定性因素构成了一种毫无根据的简化主义。在这里,正如在其近期判例的其他方面一样,最高法院将普通法权利持有人作为分析的支点。这一框架使该理论倾向于反对监管,因为它不可避免地将国家视为可疑的闯入者。下级法院的案件证明了法院狭隘的商业活动分析所产生的混乱。我们为商业条款案件提供了一个“立法主义”框架,以取代这种有缺陷的、单一的方法。在立法主义方法下,立法文本指导对相关活动的司法认定,以达到商业条款审查的目的。这种做法保留了有意义的司法监督,同时避免了法院目前法理中固有的对国会权力的任意篡夺。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication
Since 1995, the United States Supreme Court has applied a new form of rigorous judicial scrutiny in assessing the constitutional limits of the Commerce Clause, a provision that long has functioned as the central authorization of congressional power. As critics on and off the bench have noted, the Court has advanced its conception of federalism by requiring that the regulated activity itself be economic or commercial in nature. A crucial aspect of the Court's approach that has received less attention is the prior step of selecting the relevant activity for constitutional analysis. Legislation can be viewed from a variety of different perspectives, and the choice of vantage points can be critical in determining the requisite commercial nexus. In the wake of the New Deal, the Court upheld legislation if it had a commercial connection when viewed from any perspective. This Article argues that in a break from a half century of settled jurisprudence, the Court recently has insisted on selecting a single perspective as determinative. This approach, which we term "unidimensional," relocates substantial discretion from Congress to the judiciary. Drawing on the insights of recent scholarship on statutory interpretation, we illuminate the flaws in the Court's unidimensional approach. Legislation implicates multiple motives, targets, beneficiaries, and effects. For the Court to pick out a single element as dispositive constitutes a groundless form of reductionism. Here, as in other aspects of its recent jurisprudence, the Court focuses on the common-law rights holder as the fulcrum of analysis. This framework tilts the doctrine against regulation, as it inevitably casts the state as a suspect interloper. Lower court cases evidence the confusion that the Court's narrow commercial activity analysis has generated. In place of this flawed, unidimensional approach, we offer a "legislativist" framework for Commerce Clause cases. Under the legislativist method, the text of the legislation guides the judicial identification of the relevant activities for purposes of Commerce Clause scrutiny. This approach retains meaningful judicial oversight, while avoiding the arbitrary usurpation of congressional authority inherent in the Court's current jurisprudence.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
4.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1915, the Cornell Law Review is a student-run and student-edited journal that strives to publish novel scholarship that will have an immediate and lasting impact on the legal community. The Cornell Law Review publishes six issues annually consisting of articles, essays, book reviews, and student notes.
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