信义义务的批判资源理论

IF 2.4 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
D. Gordon Smith
{"title":"信义义务的批判资源理论","authors":"D. Gordon Smith","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.339100","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article proposes a new theory to unify the law of fiduciary duty. The prevailing view holds that fiduciary law is atomistic, arising for varied reasons in established categories of cases (such as trustee-beneficiary and director-shareholder) and ad hoc in relationships where one person trusts another and becomes vulnerable to harm as a result. By contrast, the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty holds that every relationship properly designated as \"fiduciary\" conforms to the following pattern: one party (the \"fiduciary\") acts on behalf of another party (the \"beneficiary\") while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary. Relying on insights from the property rights theory of the firm, this critical resource theory holds that the primary purpose of the law of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism within relationships that fit this pattern. The beneficiary initially protects against opportunism through self-help denying or threatening to deny the fiduciary access to the critical resource that is an essential platform for opportunistic behavior in these settings. Fiduciary law supplements self-help by depriving the fiduciary of the benefits from opportunism. By requiring the existence of a critical resource at the core of all fiduciary relationships, the critical resource theory assists courts in differentiating fiduciary relationships from relationships in which harm is caused merely by misplaced trust. The critical resource theory also justifies the varying intensity of fiduciary duties across fiduciary relationships: Where self-help is effective, fiduciary constraints are relatively weak, and where self-help is weak, fiduciary constraints are relatively intense. Three additional implications of the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty are also developed: (1) The critical resource theory implies that fiduciary duty and the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing are close cousins, both imposing loyalty obligations of varying intensity to combat opportunism; (2) the critical resource theory affirms the capacity of parties in a fiduciary relationship to contract out of fiduciary duties; and (3) the critical resource theory explains why restitution is the usual remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty.","PeriodicalId":47503,"journal":{"name":"Vanderbilt Law Review","volume":"55 1","pages":"1399-1497"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2002-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"81","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty\",\"authors\":\"D. Gordon Smith\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.339100\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This Article proposes a new theory to unify the law of fiduciary duty. The prevailing view holds that fiduciary law is atomistic, arising for varied reasons in established categories of cases (such as trustee-beneficiary and director-shareholder) and ad hoc in relationships where one person trusts another and becomes vulnerable to harm as a result. By contrast, the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty holds that every relationship properly designated as \\\"fiduciary\\\" conforms to the following pattern: one party (the \\\"fiduciary\\\") acts on behalf of another party (the \\\"beneficiary\\\") while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary. Relying on insights from the property rights theory of the firm, this critical resource theory holds that the primary purpose of the law of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism within relationships that fit this pattern. The beneficiary initially protects against opportunism through self-help denying or threatening to deny the fiduciary access to the critical resource that is an essential platform for opportunistic behavior in these settings. Fiduciary law supplements self-help by depriving the fiduciary of the benefits from opportunism. By requiring the existence of a critical resource at the core of all fiduciary relationships, the critical resource theory assists courts in differentiating fiduciary relationships from relationships in which harm is caused merely by misplaced trust. The critical resource theory also justifies the varying intensity of fiduciary duties across fiduciary relationships: Where self-help is effective, fiduciary constraints are relatively weak, and where self-help is weak, fiduciary constraints are relatively intense. Three additional implications of the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty are also developed: (1) The critical resource theory implies that fiduciary duty and the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing are close cousins, both imposing loyalty obligations of varying intensity to combat opportunism; (2) the critical resource theory affirms the capacity of parties in a fiduciary relationship to contract out of fiduciary duties; and (3) the critical resource theory explains why restitution is the usual remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47503,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Vanderbilt Law Review\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"1399-1497\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-11-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"81\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Vanderbilt Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.339100\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Vanderbilt Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.339100","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 81

摘要

本文提出了一种统一信义义务法律的新理论。普遍的观点认为,信托法是原子性的,在既定类别的案件(如受托人-受益人和董事-股东)中由于各种原因产生,在一个人信任另一个人并因此容易受到伤害的特殊关系中产生。相比之下,信义义务的关键资源理论认为,每一种被恰当地指定为“信义”的关系都符合以下模式:一方(“受托人”)代表另一方(“受益人”)行事,同时对属于受益人的关键资源行使自由裁量权。基于企业产权理论的见解,这一批判性资源理论认为,信义义务法的主要目的是在符合这种模式的关系中打击机会主义。受益人最初通过自助拒绝或威胁拒绝受托人获得关键资源来防止机会主义,而关键资源是这些环境中机会主义行为的基本平台。信托法通过剥夺受托人从机会主义中获得的利益来补充自助。通过要求在所有信义关系的核心存在关键资源,关键资源理论帮助法院区分信义关系与仅仅由错误的信任造成伤害的关系。关键资源理论也证明了不同信义关系中信义义务强度的变化:在自助有效的地方,信义约束相对较弱,在自助较弱的地方,信义约束相对较强。本文还发展了信义义务批判资源理论的三个附加含义:(1)批判资源理论暗示信义义务与诚信和公平交易的合同义务是近亲,都施加了不同强度的忠诚义务来打击机会主义;(2)关键资源理论肯定了信义关系中的当事人有能力通过契约解除信义义务;(3)关键资源理论解释了为什么赔偿是违反信义义务的通常补救措施。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty
This Article proposes a new theory to unify the law of fiduciary duty. The prevailing view holds that fiduciary law is atomistic, arising for varied reasons in established categories of cases (such as trustee-beneficiary and director-shareholder) and ad hoc in relationships where one person trusts another and becomes vulnerable to harm as a result. By contrast, the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty holds that every relationship properly designated as "fiduciary" conforms to the following pattern: one party (the "fiduciary") acts on behalf of another party (the "beneficiary") while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary. Relying on insights from the property rights theory of the firm, this critical resource theory holds that the primary purpose of the law of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism within relationships that fit this pattern. The beneficiary initially protects against opportunism through self-help denying or threatening to deny the fiduciary access to the critical resource that is an essential platform for opportunistic behavior in these settings. Fiduciary law supplements self-help by depriving the fiduciary of the benefits from opportunism. By requiring the existence of a critical resource at the core of all fiduciary relationships, the critical resource theory assists courts in differentiating fiduciary relationships from relationships in which harm is caused merely by misplaced trust. The critical resource theory also justifies the varying intensity of fiduciary duties across fiduciary relationships: Where self-help is effective, fiduciary constraints are relatively weak, and where self-help is weak, fiduciary constraints are relatively intense. Three additional implications of the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty are also developed: (1) The critical resource theory implies that fiduciary duty and the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing are close cousins, both imposing loyalty obligations of varying intensity to combat opportunism; (2) the critical resource theory affirms the capacity of parties in a fiduciary relationship to contract out of fiduciary duties; and (3) the critical resource theory explains why restitution is the usual remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc is an online forum designed to advance scholarly discussion. En Banc offers professors, practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law Review. En Banc permits extended discussion of our articles in a way that maintains academic integrity and provides authors with a quicker approach to publication. When reexamining a case “en banc” an appellate court operates at its highest level, with all judges present and participating “on the bench.” We chose the name “En Banc” to capture this spirit of focused review and provide a forum for further dialogue where all can be present and participate.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信