宪法赋予总统对恐怖组织和包庇或支持恐怖组织的国家采取军事行动的权力

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
R. Delahunty, J. Yoo
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引用次数: 11

摘要

2001年9月11日对美国的恐怖袭击引发了关于总统采取军事行动的权力的重要问题。尽管国会迅速采取行动,通过立法授权总统对恐怖分子及其同伙采取军事行动,但我们认为,即使没有这样的立法,总统也有广泛的宪法权力,可以部署军事力量报复与9 / 11袭击有关的人。国会在其最近的立法中承认了这种内在的行政权力,正如它早先在《战争权力决议》中所做的那样。此外,总统不仅拥有对涉嫌参与针对美国的恐怖袭击的任何个人、组织或国家进行报复的固有权力,还拥有对涉嫌窝藏或支持此类组织的外国进行报复的固有权力。最后,我们认为,总统对恐怖分子和庇护或支持恐怖分子的国家部署军事力量的宪法权力既包括对过去袭击作出反应的权力,也包括对未来袭击采取先发制人行动的权力。我们的分析分为四个部分。首先,我们考察宪法的文本和结构。我们的结论是,《宪法》赋予总统作为总司令和国家在外交关系中的唯一机关的全部权力,在国外使用军事力量,特别是在对美国人民和领土受到突然的、无法预料的攻击所造成的严重国家紧急情况作出反应时。其次,我们通过审查解释总统宪法权力的行政和司法声明和决定来确认这一结论。第三,我们分析了相关的历史先例,这些先例支持总统在这些问题上的权威。最后,我们讨论承认总统有充分权力使用武力对美国遭受的9 / 11袭击作出反应并阻止未来同类袭击的国会立法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 raised important questions concerning the President's authority to take military action in response. Although Congress acted promptly to pass legislation authorizing the President to take military action against the terrorists and those linked to them, we argue that the President has broad constitutional power, even without such legislation, to deploy military force to retaliate against those implicated in the September 11 attacks. Congress acknowledged this inherent executive power in its recent legislation, as it had earlier in the War Powers Resolution. Further, the President has the inherent power not only to retaliate against any person, organization, or state suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on the United States, but also against foreign states suspected of harboring or supporting such organizations. Finally, we argue that the President's constitutional authority to deploy military force against terrorists and the states that harbor or support them includes both the power to respond to past attacks and the power to act preemptively against future ones. Our analysis falls into four parts. First, we examine the constitutional text and structure. We conclude that the Constitution vests the President with the plenary authority, as Commander in Chief and the sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations, to use military force abroad, especially in response to grave national emergencies created by sudden, unforeseen attacks on the people and territory of the United States. Second, we confirm that conclusion by reviewing executive and judicial statements and decisions interpreting the President's constitutional powers. Third, we analyze the relevant historical precedent, which supports the argument for Presidential authority in these matters. Finally, we discuss congressional enactments that acknowledge the President's full authority to use force both to respond to the September 11 attacks on the United States and to deter future strikes of that nature.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy is published three times annually by the Harvard Society for Law & Public Policy, Inc., an organization of Harvard Law School students. The Journal is one of the most widely circulated student-edited law reviews and the nation’s leading forum for conservative and libertarian legal scholarship. The late Stephen Eberhard and former Senator and Secretary of Energy E. Spencer Abraham founded the journal twenty-eight years ago and many journal alumni have risen to prominent legal positions in the government and at the nation’s top law firms.
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