国会获取信息:利用立法意愿和杠杆

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Duke Law Journal Pub Date : 2002-11-01 DOI:10.2307/1373174
Louis Fisher
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引用次数: 5

摘要

总统及其顾问在拒绝向国会提供文件、拒绝允许行政官员在国会委员会作证时,会援引各种法律原则。国会可以整理自己令人印象深刻的法律引用清单,以捍卫立法机构获取信息的权利,即使总统主张行政特权。这些法律和宪法原则虽然可能是经过精心打磨的,但往往被当前的政治和实际考虑所压倒。本文强调了决定大多数信息纠纷的政治解决。法院发挥了作用,但如果认为方便地引用司法意见就能获胜,那就错了。在国会决心行使许多可用的强制手段的强大政治力量面前,纯粹基于法律理由解决部门间争端的努力可能不得不让步。出于同样的原因,一个内部分裂或不确定其目的的国会
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage
Presidents and their advisers cite various legal principles when they withhold documents from Congress and refuse to allow executive officials to testify before congressional committees. Congress can marshal its own impressive list of legal citations to defend legislative access to information, even when presidents assert executive privilege. These legal and constitutional principles, finely-honed as they might be, are often overridden by the politics of the moment and practical considerations. This Essay highlights the political settlements that decide most information disputes. Courts play a role, but it is a mistake to believe that handy cites from judicial opinions will win the day. Efforts to resolve interbranch disputes on purely legal grounds may have to give ground in the face of superior political muscle by a Congress determined to exercise the many coercive tools available to it. By the same token, a Congress that is internally divided or uncertain about its in-
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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