供应点反向拍卖:一个新的拍卖机制与保护合同的申请

IF 1.2 4区经济学 Q3 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI:10.22004/AG.ECON.302499

S. Otto, Gregory L. Poe, D. Just

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引用次数: 1

摘要

环境服务拍卖中参与者的寻租行为减少了可负担合同的数量，降低了环境保护水平。我们提出了一种新的拍卖机制，供应点反向拍卖(PPRA)，以减轻这种寻租行为。PPRA包括一个公共部分，其中一个人接受合同的可能性受到其他接受要约的总和的影响。我们为新机制提供了理论支持，并进行了实验室实验。实验结果表明，与反向选择性拍卖相比，PPRA的平均出价低12.57% ~ 58.17%，具体差异取决于所比较的机制和拍卖参数。因此，实施公共资源采购计划以采购环境或保育产品，可能会增加获得这些服务的总量。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Provision Point Reverse Auction: A New Auction Mechanism with Applications for Conservation Contracts

Rent-seeking behavior by participants in payment for environmental services auctions reduces the number of affordable contracts and decreases environmental protection. We propose a new auction mechanism, the provision point reverse auction (PPRA), to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. The PPRA includes a public component where the probability of contract acceptance for one individual is affected by the sum of the other accepted offers. We provide theoretical support for the new mechanism and follow with laboratory experiments. The experiments yield average offers between 12.57% to 58.17% smaller in a PPRA compared to alternate reverse discriminative auctions, with the exact difference dependent on the compared mechanism and auction parameters. Implementing a PPRA to procure environmental or conservation goods may therefore increase the total quantity of these services acquired.

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来源期刊

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 社会科学-农业经济与政策

CiteScore

2.30

自引率

7.10%

发文量

审稿时长

>36 weeks

期刊介绍： The mission of the Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics is to publish creative and scholarly economic studies in agriculture, natural resources, and related areas. Manuscripts dealing with the economics of food and agriculture, natural resources and the environment, human resources, and rural development issues are especially encouraged. The Journal provides a forum for topics of interest to those performing economic research as well as to those involved with economic policy and education. Submission of comments on articles previously published in the Journal is welcomed.