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引用次数: 1
摘要
由首席法官梅里克·加兰(Merrick Garland)撰写的华盛顿特区巡回法院2015年的意见,诉因诉联邦贸易委员会(Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission),是一个具有里程碑意义的支持透明度的意见,要求行政部门机构对误读《信息自由法》的两项收费条款负责。除了对新闻媒体和公共利益的《信息自由法》申请者群体的贡献外,该意见还证明了国会在《信息自由法》改革方面普遍存在的方法缺陷。《信息自由法》法规效率低下,因为它要求并要求机构对关键条款作出解释,而这与其不尊重的从头审查标准不一致。鉴于行政部门机构必须遵守新闻媒体和公共利益行为者的监督和透明度努力的自然阻碍因素,各机构以与其公共政策目标背道而驰的方式利用《信息自由法》。这一法定问题在2016年《信息自由法改进法案》中仍然存在。本文认为,国会应该以更精确的立法来对待《信息自由法》改革,以更好地实现其公共政策目标。《信息自由法》在立法中是独一无二的,因为它是一项关于透明度和监督的综合性法规,不隶属于任何机构,并对机构遵守其目标产生强有力的抑制作用。它的从头开始的审查标准传达了一种不尊重,这与其授权机构解释权的规定相矛盾。
Oversight of Oversight: A Proposal for More Effective FOIA Reform
The D.C. Circuit’s 2015 opinion, Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission, authored by its Chief Judge, Merrick Garland, is a landmark pro-transparency opinion that held an executive branch agency accountable for misreading two Freedom of Information Act fee provisions. In addition to its contribution to the news media and public interest FOIA requester communities, the opinion evidences a pervasive methodological flaw in the congressional approach to FOIA reform. The FOIA statute is inefficient because it invites and requires agency interpretation of key provisions, which is inconsistent with its non-deferential de novo standard of review. Given the natural disincentives executive branch agencies have to comply with the oversight and transparency efforts of news media and public interest actors, agencies exploit FOIA in a manner that is contrary to its public policy goals. This statutory problem survives the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. This essay makes the case that Congress should approach FOIA reform with greater legislative precision to better achieve its public policy goals. FOIA is unique among legislative enactments because it is an omnibus statute of transparency and oversight, organic to no agency, and one that creates powerful disincentives for agency compliance with its goals. Its de novo standard of review conveys an absence of deference that is in tension with its provisions that delegate agency interpretative authority.