明确声明规则和宪法

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Manning
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引用次数: 9

摘要

近年来,最高法院越来越多地用宪法启发的明确陈述规则来补充传统的马布里式司法审查。这些法律解释规范有两个特点。首先,他们通过坚持国会在希望实现可能侵犯某些司法认定的宪法价值(如联邦制、不溯及力或法治)的法定结果时,特别明确地立法,向国会征收明确税。第二,正如法院所承认的,明确的陈述规则适用,即使这些规则所避免的结果本身并不违反宪法。例如,虽然本院认为,事后条款仅在刑事案件中禁止溯及既往,但本院也从该条款中(除其他外)剔除了一种更为普遍的价值,用以证明民事案件中不溯及既往的明确陈述规则是合理的。本文认为,这种明确的声明规则建立在一个错误的前提之上,即宪法包含独立的价值观,这些价值观可以被有意义地识别和执行,而不是法院从中得出的条款的具体条款。事实上,《宪法》代表了“一系列妥协”,这些妥协不仅体现了抽象的目的或价值观,而且还体现了限制和界定这些价值观的范围和内容的特定手段。如果溯后事由条款在刑事情形中禁止溯及力,则违反了将其溯及力扩展到民事情形的执行交易条款。此外,这种担忧——明确的声明规则不允许从具体的宪法手段抽象到一般的宪法目的——也适用,即使人们认为现在大多数宪法都是在法官制定的实施原则中找到的。这种原则本身往往定义了执行宪法的相对精确的方法,而不仅仅是模糊的宪法目的,而这些目的往往会激发明确的声明规则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution
In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly supplemented traditional Marbury-style judicial review with constitutionally inspired clear statement rules. These canons of statutory construction have two characteristics. First, they impose a clarity tax on Congress by insisting that Congress legislate exceptionally clearly when it wishes to achieve a statutory outcome that threatens to intrude upon some judicially identified constitutional value-such as federalism, nonretroactivity, or the rule of law. Second, as the Court has acknowledged, clear statement rules apply even though the outcomes avoided by such rules would not themselves violate the Constitution. For example, although the Court has held that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactivity only in the criminal context, the Court has also culled from that clause (among others) a more general value that it uses to justify a nonretroactivity clear statement rule for civil cases.This Essay argues that such clear statement rules rest on the mistaken premise that the Constitution contains freestanding values that can be meaningfully identified and enforced apart from the specific terms of the clauses from which the Court derives them. In fact, the Constitution represents a "bundle of compromises" that embody not merely abstract ends or values, but also particular means that limit and define the scope and the content of those values. If the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactivity in the criminal context, it violates the terms of the implementing bargain to extend its animating value to civil contexts. This concern-that clear statement rules impermissibly abstract from concrete constitutional means to general constitutional ends-applies, moreover, even if one believes that most constitutional law is now properly found in judge-made implementing doctrine. Such doctrine itself often defines relatively precise means of enforcing the Constitution, not merely the vague constitutional ends that so often animate clear statement rules.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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