最危险的正义再次骑行:重新审视法官的权力选美

IF 3 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Paul H. Edelman, J. Chen
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引用次数: 6

摘要

谁是最有权力的最高法院法官?1996年,我们根据每位大法官组成五人联盟的能力来衡量最高法院的投票权。根据最高法院在1994年和1995年任期内形成的所有联盟,我们制定了一个关于法官相对实力的通用班扎夫指数。一般来说,参与更多独特的联盟意味着更大的司法投票权。为了补充当时可用的少量决策,我们从实际观察到的涉及5个以上成员的联盟的交叉点推导出假设的5个正义联盟。林恩·贝克(Lynn Baker)教授对我们的模型提出了质疑,他倾向于采用一种基于每位大法官参与任何获胜联盟的次数的附加衡量标准。本文根据1996年以来最高法院判决的案件,对法官进行了新的权力展示。在七届以上的任期内,法院一直保留相同的人员。这种稳定性为测试司法投票权的竞争性措施提供了一个独特的机会。我们在1996年假设,更大的案例集可能会消除诉诸推断联盟的需要。从长远来看,对这一更大数据集的分析实际上削弱了我们的衡量标准和贝克教授的衡量标准的有效性。我们的结论是,有三种不同的投票权衡量标准,每一种都反映了司法权的不同方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices
Who is the most powerful Supreme Court Justice? In 1996 we measured voting power on the Court according to each Justice's ability to form five-member coalitions. From the set of all coalitions formed by the Court during its 1994 and 1995 Terms, we developed a generalized Banzhaf index of the Justices' relative strength. Generally speaking, participating in a greater number of unique coalitions translates into greater judicial voting power. To supplement the small number of decisions then available, we derived hypothetical five-Justice coalitions from the intersections of actually observed coalitions involving more than five members. Professor Lynn Baker contested our model, favoring instead an additive measure based on the number of times each Justice participated in any winning coalition. This Article stages a new Power Pageant of the Justices in light of the cases decided by the Court since 1996. For more than seven Terms, the Court has retained the same personnel. This stability provides a unique opportunity to test competing measures of judicial voting power. We hypothesized in 1996 that a larger set of cases might obviate the need to resort to inferred coalitions. Analysis of this larger data set in fact undermines the validity of both our measure and that of Professor Baker over the long run. We conclude that there are three different measures of voting power each reflecting a different aspect of judicial power.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: In January 1917, Professor Henry J. Fletcher launched the Minnesota Law Review with lofty aspirations: “A well-conducted law review . . . ought to do something to develop the spirit of statesmanship as distinguished from a dry professionalism. It ought at the same time contribute a little something to the systematic growth of the whole law.” For the next forty years, in conjunction with the Minnesota State Bar Association, the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School directed the work of student editors of the Law Review. Despite their initial oversight and vision, however, the faculty gradually handed the editorial mantle over to law students.
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