他们先在这里:美国印第安部落、种族和宪法最低限度

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
Sarah Krakoff
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在美国法律中,原住民(在《宪法》和其他地方称为“部落”)是与联邦政府有直接关系的主权国家。部落的政府地位使他们在许多法律目的上有别于其他少数群体,包括平等保护分析。在现行的平等保护原则下,促进联邦政府与部落及其成员之间独特关系的分类不受严格审查。然而,这种恭顺的做法最近受到了批评,目前正在未决案件中受到质疑。由于对宪法的理解越来越倾向于不分肤色或种族中立,法院和评论人士质疑部落的政治地位和种族地位之间的区别,并敦促法院废除有利于部落的儿童福利和博彩法律。然而,部落(作为集体)必须追溯到欧洲/美洲人定居之前的民族,以便与联邦政府建立政治关系。因此,为了在宪法下被承认为部落,作为一个最初的定义问题,部落必须由由类似血统的东西联系在一起的人们组成。血统和祖先(通常与社会法律范畴的“种族”混为一谈)是联邦对部落地位的合法承认与国会未经授权和违宪行为之间的区别。换句话说,国会不能与任何一群人建立政府对政府的关系。部落因其与北美土著人民的关系而与其他群体区别对待,联邦法院不应该用这种宪法区别来对付部落,以误导人们消除目前听起来带有“种族”色彩的所有痕迹。这里提出的论点可能被视为美国印第安人法律例外主义的一种形式。然而,这与种族形成理论将种族理解为一种结构是一致的,这种结构服务于、创造并延续了合法的从属关系,也塑造了日常的社会概念和互动。种族形成理论要求根据每个群体的从属关系所服务的社会和经济目的,对种族化进行多种解释。在补救方面,种族形成理论因此必然预见到我们可能认为的多重例外主义。扭转旨在将土著居民从大陆上消灭的政策,以及对驱使他们的印第安人的种族化理解,需要维持部落作为独立主权的政治地位,而不是以“种族”中立的非历史概念的名义摧毁它。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum
In American law, Native nations (denominated in the Constitution and elsewhere as “tribes”) are sovereigns with a direct relationship with the federal government. Tribes’ governmental status situates them differently from other minority groups for many legal purposes, including equal protection analysis. Under current equal protection doctrine, classifications that further the federal government’s unique relationship with tribes and their members are not subject to heightened scrutiny. Yet this deferential approach has been subject to recent criticism and is currently being challenged in pending cases. Swept up in the larger drift toward colorblind or race-neutral understandings of the Constitution, courts and commentators question the distinction between tribes’ political and racial status, and urge courts to strike down child welfare and gaming laws that benefit tribes. Yet tribes (as collectives) must trace their heritage to peoples who preceded European/American settlement in order to establish the political relationship with the federal government. Tribes, in order to be recognized as such under the Constitution, therefore must, as an initial definitional matter, consist of people tied together by something akin to lineage. Descent and ancestry (often conflated with the socio-legal category of “race,”) are the difference between legitimate federal recognition of tribal status and unauthorized and unconstitutional acts by Congress. Congress, in other words, cannot establish a government-to-government relationship with just any group of people. Tribes are treated differently from other groups due to their ties to the indigenous peoples of North America, and federal courts should not use that constitutional distinction against tribes in a misguided effort to eradicate all traces of things currently sounding in “race.”The argument advanced here might be seen as a form of American Indian law exceptionalism. Yet it is consistent with racial formation theory’s project of understanding race as a construction that serves, creates, and perpetuates legalized subordination, and that also shapes daily social conceptions and interactions. Racial formation theory calls for multiple accounts of racialization depending on the social and economic purposes served by each groups’ subordination. On the remedial side, racial formation theory therefore necessarily anticipates what we might think of as multiple exceptionalisms. Reversing policies that aimed to eliminate Native people from the continent, and the racialized understanding of Indians that drove them, requires maintaining the political status of tribes as separate sovereigns, not destroying it in the name of an ahistorical conception of “race” neutrality.
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