{"title":"吉本斯谬论","authors":"Richard A. Primus","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2732727","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote that “the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” Modern courts use that phrase to mean that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers are, as a whole, less than a grant of general legislative authority. But Marshall wasn’t saying that. He wasn’t talking about the Constitution’s overall enumeration of congressional powers at all, and nothing in his analysis purported to limit what Congress can do. Modern courts and commentators systematically misread Marshall on this point and in so doing lend unjustified credence to one of the central misconceptions of constitutional doctrine: that the enumerated powers of Congress must in practice authorize less legislation than a grant of general legislative authority would. Properly understood, Marshall’s statement about enumeration does not support that idea.","PeriodicalId":90761,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania journal of constitutional law","volume":"19 1","pages":"567"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Gibbons Fallacy\",\"authors\":\"Richard A. Primus\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2732727\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote that “the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” Modern courts use that phrase to mean that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers are, as a whole, less than a grant of general legislative authority. But Marshall wasn’t saying that. He wasn’t talking about the Constitution’s overall enumeration of congressional powers at all, and nothing in his analysis purported to limit what Congress can do. Modern courts and commentators systematically misread Marshall on this point and in so doing lend unjustified credence to one of the central misconceptions of constitutional doctrine: that the enumerated powers of Congress must in practice authorize less legislation than a grant of general legislative authority would. Properly understood, Marshall’s statement about enumeration does not support that idea.\",\"PeriodicalId\":90761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Pennsylvania journal of constitutional law\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"567\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-02-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Pennsylvania journal of constitutional law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2732727\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Pennsylvania journal of constitutional law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2732727","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在吉本斯诉奥格登案(Gibbons v. Ogden)中,首席大法官约翰·马歇尔(John Marshall)写道:“列举的前提是没有列举的东西。”现代法院使用这句话的意思是,宪法对国会权力的列举表明,作为一个整体,这些权力小于授予的一般立法权。但马歇尔不是这么说的。他说的根本不是宪法对国会权力的全面列举,他的分析中也没有任何意在限制国会所能做的事情。现代法院和评论人士在这一点上系统性地误读了马歇尔的话,并因此不合理地证实了宪法理论的一个核心误解:即国会的列举权力在实践中所授权的立法必须少于授予一般立法权。如果正确理解,马歇尔关于枚举的陈述并不支持这种观点。
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote that “the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” Modern courts use that phrase to mean that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers are, as a whole, less than a grant of general legislative authority. But Marshall wasn’t saying that. He wasn’t talking about the Constitution’s overall enumeration of congressional powers at all, and nothing in his analysis purported to limit what Congress can do. Modern courts and commentators systematically misread Marshall on this point and in so doing lend unjustified credence to one of the central misconceptions of constitutional doctrine: that the enumerated powers of Congress must in practice authorize less legislation than a grant of general legislative authority would. Properly understood, Marshall’s statement about enumeration does not support that idea.