超越竞选财务改革

Tabatha Abu El-Haj
{"title":"超越竞选财务改革","authors":"Tabatha Abu El-Haj","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729976","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While the public blames the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC for the outsized political influence of the superwealthy, experts in the field know that the constitutional constraints on our ability to limit the political influence of moneyed elites long-predate Citizens United and pose a formidable barrier to effective campaign finance reform. Nevertheless, the most consistent calls in legal circles are for yet more campaign finance reform. This Article argues that it is time for those serious about curtailing the influence of money in politics to recognize that the struggle for effective campaign finance reforms has run its course. Renewed democratic accountability requires an organized, informed, and representative electorate. The field of election law must, therefore, come to grips with the evidence that the apparent crisis of representation is attributable to profound social and political changes since the 1970s, foremost among them, a transformation of civic associations critically linked to legal choices. While increasing the representativeness of the electorate that turns out to vote must remain a key priority for the field, it is time to attend to the ways that law might encourage civic reorganization — just getting voters out on election days is too little too late. In making this argument, this Article defends two controversial claims: First, the First Amendment tradition poses a formidable barrier to curtailing the influence of moneyed interests regardless of the composition of the Supreme Court. Second, the widespread skepticism in the field that the electorate can be a source of democratic accountability is overstated: The fact that voters, as individuals, are incapable of monitoring elected officials does not foreclose the possibility that voters, as groups, could demand democratic responsiveness. In fact, the historical record reveals that ordinary citizens can exercise influence over the officials elected to represent them when they are well organized and vote.","PeriodicalId":80721,"journal":{"name":"Boston College law review. Boston College. Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Beyond Campaign Finance Reform\",\"authors\":\"Tabatha Abu El-Haj\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2729976\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While the public blames the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC for the outsized political influence of the superwealthy, experts in the field know that the constitutional constraints on our ability to limit the political influence of moneyed elites long-predate Citizens United and pose a formidable barrier to effective campaign finance reform. Nevertheless, the most consistent calls in legal circles are for yet more campaign finance reform. This Article argues that it is time for those serious about curtailing the influence of money in politics to recognize that the struggle for effective campaign finance reforms has run its course. Renewed democratic accountability requires an organized, informed, and representative electorate. The field of election law must, therefore, come to grips with the evidence that the apparent crisis of representation is attributable to profound social and political changes since the 1970s, foremost among them, a transformation of civic associations critically linked to legal choices. While increasing the representativeness of the electorate that turns out to vote must remain a key priority for the field, it is time to attend to the ways that law might encourage civic reorganization — just getting voters out on election days is too little too late. In making this argument, this Article defends two controversial claims: First, the First Amendment tradition poses a formidable barrier to curtailing the influence of moneyed interests regardless of the composition of the Supreme Court. Second, the widespread skepticism in the field that the electorate can be a source of democratic accountability is overstated: The fact that voters, as individuals, are incapable of monitoring elected officials does not foreclose the possibility that voters, as groups, could demand democratic responsiveness. In fact, the historical record reveals that ordinary citizens can exercise influence over the officials elected to represent them when they are well organized and vote.\",\"PeriodicalId\":80721,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Boston College law review. Boston College. Law School\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-02-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Boston College law review. Boston College. Law School\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729976\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Boston College law review. Boston College. Law School","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729976","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

虽然公众将超级富豪的巨大政治影响力归咎于美国最高法院在“联合公民”(Citizens United)诉联邦选举委员会(FEC)一案中的裁决,但该领域的专家知道,宪法对我们限制有钱精英政治影响力的能力的限制,早在“联合公民”案出现之前就存在了,并对有效的竞选资金改革构成了巨大障碍。然而,法律界最一致的呼声是要求进行更多的竞选资金改革。本文认为,对于那些认真考虑减少金钱对政治影响的人来说,是时候认识到,为有效的竞选财务改革而进行的斗争已经走到了尽头。更新的民主问责制需要一个有组织、知情和具有代表性的选民。因此,选举法领域必须认真研究这样的证据,即表象上的代表权危机可归因于1970年代以来深刻的社会和政治变化,其中最重要的是与法律选择密切相关的公民协会的转变。虽然增加选民的代表性必须仍然是这个领域的一个关键优先事项,但现在是时候考虑法律可能鼓励公民重组的方式了-只是在选举日让选民出去太少,也太晚了。在提出这一论点时,本条捍卫了两个有争议的主张:首先,无论最高法院的构成如何,第一修正案的传统都对削弱金钱利益集团的影响构成了强大的障碍。其次,该领域对选民能否成为民主问责来源的普遍怀疑被夸大了:选民作为个人无法监督民选官员,这一事实并不排除选民作为群体要求民主回应的可能性。事实上,历史记录表明,当普通公民组织良好并投票时,他们可以对当选代表他们的官员施加影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Beyond Campaign Finance Reform
While the public blames the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC for the outsized political influence of the superwealthy, experts in the field know that the constitutional constraints on our ability to limit the political influence of moneyed elites long-predate Citizens United and pose a formidable barrier to effective campaign finance reform. Nevertheless, the most consistent calls in legal circles are for yet more campaign finance reform. This Article argues that it is time for those serious about curtailing the influence of money in politics to recognize that the struggle for effective campaign finance reforms has run its course. Renewed democratic accountability requires an organized, informed, and representative electorate. The field of election law must, therefore, come to grips with the evidence that the apparent crisis of representation is attributable to profound social and political changes since the 1970s, foremost among them, a transformation of civic associations critically linked to legal choices. While increasing the representativeness of the electorate that turns out to vote must remain a key priority for the field, it is time to attend to the ways that law might encourage civic reorganization — just getting voters out on election days is too little too late. In making this argument, this Article defends two controversial claims: First, the First Amendment tradition poses a formidable barrier to curtailing the influence of moneyed interests regardless of the composition of the Supreme Court. Second, the widespread skepticism in the field that the electorate can be a source of democratic accountability is overstated: The fact that voters, as individuals, are incapable of monitoring elected officials does not foreclose the possibility that voters, as groups, could demand democratic responsiveness. In fact, the historical record reveals that ordinary citizens can exercise influence over the officials elected to represent them when they are well organized and vote.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信