全球反托拉斯的地方法律

E. Swaine
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引用次数: 6

摘要

反托拉斯是国际法无用性的简要说明。尽管国际合作在适应全球经济活动和协调国家反垄断制度的繁荣方面明显有用,但几乎没有具有约束力的协议或习惯国际法。事实上,对单边反垄断管辖权的任何“合理性”约束在很大程度上都被否定了,部分原因是它为联邦法院描述的有问题的角色,甚至在此之前就被认为是惯例不连贯和无关紧要的证据。本文认为,现有的学说,以及它的企图否定,都是完全错误的。在考察了现有国际安排的局限性之后,我提出了一种新的、通用的方法来确定我所说的“当地国际法”——一个评估潜在习俗的过程,从规范对国际社会特定成员和主题的潜在应用开始,以及在国内情况下的表述、适应和执行。特殊的习惯,适用于以一种对地方行为者敏感的方式解释联邦法规,使我们能够克服许多普遍主义的缺陷,这些缺陷折磨着合理性方法。将这一理论应用于反垄断,我主张承认反垄断礼让,这一原则要求考虑某些国家的合法利益,特别是经合组织成员国之间协调监管国际反垄断事务的前景。这一原则及其基本方法,使我们能够对美国反垄断法的各种执行手段有一个全新的认识。虽然反垄断礼让约束着联邦机构,但它并不直接约束私人执法;最具争议的是,它反映了宪法对州政府执法者处理必要的政府间关系的能力的限制,这些限制最好通过联邦-州协议来调解,从而将国际反垄断礼让带回到国内。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Local Law of Global Antitrust
Antitrust is a brief for the uselessness of international law. Notwithstanding the apparent utility of international cooperation in accommodating global economic activity and reconciling the flourishing of national antitrust regimes, there is little by way of binding agreement or customary international law. Indeed, any "reasonableness" constraint on unilateral antitrust jurisdiction has largely been repudiated, in part because of the problematic role it describes for federal courts, and even beforehand was being held out as proof of the incoherence and irrelevance of custom. This article argues that existing doctrine, and its attempted repudiation, are both entirely misconceived. After examining the limits of existing international arrangements, I set out a new, general methodology for identifying what I term "local international law" - a process for evaluating potential custom that begins with the norm's potential application to particular members and subjects-matter within the international community, and its articulation, adaptation, and enforcement in domestic circumstances. Special custom, applicable through the interpretation of federal statutes in a fashion sensitive to local actors, permits us to overcome many of the universalist flaws that afflicted the reasonableness approach. Applying this theory to antitrust, I advocate recognizing antitrust comity, a principle requiring consideration of certain nations' legitimate interests, in particular the prospects for coordinated regulation of international antitrust matters among OECD members. This principle, and the underlying method, permit a fresh look at the diverse means of enforcing U.S. antitrust law. While antitrust comity binds the federal agencies, it does not directly constrain private enforcement; most controversially, it reflects constitutionally-premised limitations on the ability of state government enforcers to conduct the necessary intergovernmental relations, limits best mediated through a federal-state protocol that brings international antitrust comity home.
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