没有权宜之计

V. Inozemtsev
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It refers to a course toward moderate belt-tightening - higher\n taxes and stricter collection of them - as well as limiting imports\n through protectionist measures. Government propaganda must be\n stepped up to convince the Russian people that scheming foreigners\n are the cause of their problems, not their leaders’ failed economic\n policy. ... This is simply \"milking the economy.\" Oil and gas revenues will\n fall. They totaled 7.43 trillion rubles in 2014, dropped to 5.86\n trillion rubles in 2015 and could fall to 4.5 trillion rubles in\n 2016. Therefore, the authorities will have to cut project\n investment, reduce funding to the regions and scale back financial\n incentives for state employees. ... That will lead to further decline in an economy kept afloat by\n government investment and purchases. Import volumes have dropped to\n half of their 2014 level, which means a decline in value-added tax\n revenues from the sale of those goods. ... The additional pressure that places on business, coupled with\n the reduction in state orders and the shrinking incomes of\n government employees, will lead to production declines. The\n authorities will use Central Bank emissions and quasi-emissions to\n limit spending from the government’s reserve fund, but that will\n not halt the recession. The 1.4% drop in gross domestic product\n during the first quarter of 2016 will only fuel further\n declines. ... Economic recovery is unlikely in 2017; in fact, I expect Russia\n will see no economic growth even if oil prices rise to as much as\n $65 to $70 per barrel. ... Even if leaders manage to avoid cutting salaries for state\n employees and save money by eliminating the most useless\n expenditures, a general population frightened by the crisis and\n burdened by high interest rates is unlikely to increase personal\n spending. Higher oil prices will strengthen the ruble. That will\n result in lower profits ... for major raw materials corporations, thus reducing ruble\n revenues to the federal budget. Most businesspeople will continue\n to expect further stagnation and will be unlikely to invest in new\n projects. ... If oil prices rise, the authorities will readopt their 2010\n attitude. At that time, they expected an imminent end to the crisis\n and immediately gave up on liberalizing business conditions or\n implementing economic structural reforms. Russia will enter a\n period of classic stagnation, marked by a lack of incentive for\n change. ... This leads to a simple and rather pessimistic conclusion: Russia\n is trapped by its dependence on commodity markets. ... Russia has no realistic plan for modernization, particularly\n given its isolation and lack of potential economic partners.\n Regardless of how oil prices and the ruble finally reach\n equilibrium, no qualitative change will result. ... There are only two scenarios by which Russia could see renewed\n economic growth in the coming years. ... The first requires oil prices to continuously rise, as they\n previously did throughout President Vladimir Putin’s terms in\n office. ... However, data from the past decades indicates that oil prices\n must rise by 15% to 20% annually for economic growth to resume (all\n [other] things being equal). In practical terms, that means oil\n prices must reach approximately $80 per barrel by 2018 and no less\n than $110 per barrel by 2020. ... Such a scenario might provide economic growth of 2% to 4% per\n annum and return the Russian economy to 2008 levels by 2019 - 2020.\n However, that scenario is unlikely: The current price war and the\n sharp increase in supply from new forms of energy such as shale oil\n and biofuels could effectively cap prices at $60 per barrel. ... There is a second option. Rather than implementing the necessary\n structural reforms, leaders could make it easier to do business in\n Russia by reinstating relatively free trade, returning a\n significant volume of land in central Russia to the marketplace,\n waiving taxes for new businesses, creating potent guarantees for\n foreign investment and launching mechanisms for stimulating\n demand. ... The government could take the position that the creation of jobs\n and economic growth are temporarily more important than collecting\n taxes, and that it is better to let people earn money on their own\n than to put them on the government payroll.","PeriodicalId":76676,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of the Michigan Dental Association","volume":"68 1","pages":"12-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"NO QUICK FIX\",\"authors\":\"V. 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It refers to a course toward moderate belt-tightening - higher\\n taxes and stricter collection of them - as well as limiting imports\\n through protectionist measures. Government propaganda must be\\n stepped up to convince the Russian people that scheming foreigners\\n are the cause of their problems, not their leaders’ failed economic\\n policy. ... This is simply \\\"milking the economy.\\\" Oil and gas revenues will\\n fall. They totaled 7.43 trillion rubles in 2014, dropped to 5.86\\n trillion rubles in 2015 and could fall to 4.5 trillion rubles in\\n 2016. Therefore, the authorities will have to cut project\\n investment, reduce funding to the regions and scale back financial\\n incentives for state employees. ... That will lead to further decline in an economy kept afloat by\\n government investment and purchases. Import volumes have dropped to\\n half of their 2014 level, which means a decline in value-added tax\\n revenues from the sale of those goods. ... The additional pressure that places on business, coupled with\\n the reduction in state orders and the shrinking incomes of\\n government employees, will lead to production declines. The\\n authorities will use Central Bank emissions and quasi-emissions to\\n limit spending from the government’s reserve fund, but that will\\n not halt the recession. The 1.4% drop in gross domestic product\\n during the first quarter of 2016 will only fuel further\\n declines. ... Economic recovery is unlikely in 2017; in fact, I expect Russia\\n will see no economic growth even if oil prices rise to as much as\\n $65 to $70 per barrel. ... Even if leaders manage to avoid cutting salaries for state\\n employees and save money by eliminating the most useless\\n expenditures, a general population frightened by the crisis and\\n burdened by high interest rates is unlikely to increase personal\\n spending. Higher oil prices will strengthen the ruble. 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引用次数: 9

摘要

(作者:弗拉迪斯拉夫·伊诺泽姆采夫,后工业研究中心主任,德国外交关系委员会贝特霍尔德·贝茨研究员)《莫斯科时报》,2016年5月19日,第5页。今年开局不太好。油价跌至每桶30美元以下,至少5%的预算赤字似乎不可避免。但现在俄罗斯的政治精英们终于松了一口气。油价已升至每桶40美元以上,专家预测,油价更有可能继续攀升,而不是像去年冬天那样暴跌. ...当然,油价走势无法预测。但财政官员最近表示,如果油价保持在每桶40美元至50美元之间,经济将进入“新的现实”。这是什么意思?…它指的是一条适度紧缩的道路——提高税收和更严格的征税——以及通过保护主义措施限制进口。政府必须加强宣传,让俄罗斯人民相信,他们的问题是诡计多门的外国人造成的,而不是他们领导人失败的经济政策. ...这就是“榨取经济”。石油和天然气收入将下降。2014年的总金额为7.43万亿卢布,2015年降至5.86万亿卢布,2016年可能降至4.5万亿卢布。因此,当局将不得不削减项目投资,减少对地区的资助,并缩减对政府雇员的财政激励. ...这将导致依靠政府投资和购买维持的经济进一步下滑。进口量已降至2014年水平的一半,这意味着来自这些商品销售的增值税收入下降. ...企业承受的额外压力,加上政府订单的减少和政府雇员收入的减少,将导致产量下降。当局将利用中央银行的排放和准排放来限制政府储备基金的支出,但这并不能阻止经济衰退。2016年第一季度国内生产总值(gdp)下降1.4%只会进一步加剧下滑. ...2017年经济不太可能复苏;事实上,我认为即使油价上涨到每桶65 ~ 70美元,俄罗斯也不会出现经济增长. ...即使领导人设法避免削减政府雇员的工资,并通过取消最无用的支出来节省资金,被危机吓坏的普通民众和背负高利率的民众也不太可能增加个人支出。高油价将使卢布升值。这将导致利润下降。对于主要的原材料公司来说,从而减少了联邦预算的卢布收入。大多数商人预计经济会进一步停滞,不太可能投资新项目. ...如果油价上涨,当局将重新采取2010年的态度。当时,他们认为危机很快就会结束,因此立即放弃了开放企业条件或实施经济结构改革。俄罗斯将进入一个典型的停滞时期,其特征是缺乏变革的动力. ...由此可以得出一个简单而相当悲观的结论:俄罗斯受困于对大宗商品市场的依赖. ...俄罗斯没有现实的现代化计划,特别是考虑到它的孤立和缺乏潜在的经济伙伴。无论油价和卢布最终如何达到平衡,都不会导致质变. ...只有两种情况下,俄罗斯可以看到新的经济增长在未来几年. ...第一个要求油价持续上涨,就像之前在俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)执政期间所做的那样. ...然而,过去几十年的数据表明,油价必须每年上涨15%至20%才能恢复经济增长(在其他条件相同的情况下)。实际上,这意味着到2018年油价必须达到每桶80美元左右,到2020年不低于每桶110美元. ...这种情况可能会带来每年2%至4%的经济增长,并在2019 - 2020年使俄罗斯经济恢复到2008年的水平。然而,这种情况不太可能发生:目前的价格战以及页岩油和生物燃料等新能源供应的急剧增加,可能会有效地将价格限制在每桶60美元. ...还有第二个选择。与其实施必要的结构性改革,领导人不如通过恢复相对自由的贸易、将俄罗斯中部的大量土地归还给市场、免除新企业的税收、为外国投资提供强有力的保障,以及启动刺激需求的机制. ...,让在俄罗斯做生意变得更容易 (作者:弗拉迪斯拉夫·伊诺泽姆采夫,后工业研究中心主任,德国外交关系委员会贝特霍尔德·贝茨研究员)《莫斯科时报》,2016年5月19日,第5页。今年开局不太好。油价跌至每桶30美元以下,至少5%的预算赤字似乎不可避免。但现在俄罗斯的政治精英们终于松了一口气。油价已升至每桶40美元以上,专家预测,油价更有可能继续攀升,而不是像去年冬天那样暴跌. ...当然,油价走势无法预测。但财政官员最近表示,如果油价保持在每桶40美元至50美元之间,经济将进入“新的现实”。这是什么意思?…它指的是一条适度紧缩的道路——提高税收和更严格的征税——以及通过保护主义措施限制进口。政府必须加强宣传,让俄罗斯人民相信,他们的问题是诡计多门的外国人造成的,而不是他们领导人失败的经济政策. ...这就是“榨取经济”。石油和天然气收入将下降。2014年的总金额为7.43万亿卢布,2015年降至5.86万亿卢布,2016年可能降至4.5万亿卢布。因此,当局将不得不削减项目投资,减少对地区的资助,并缩减对政府雇员的财政激励. ...这将导致依靠政府投资和购买维持的经济进一步下滑。进口量已降至2014年水平的一半,这意味着来自这些商品销售的增值税收入下降. ...企业承受的额外压力,加上政府订单的减少和政府雇员收入的减少,将导致产量下降。当局将利用中央银行的排放和准排放来限制政府储备基金的支出,但这并不能阻止经济衰退。2016年第一季度国内生产总值(gdp)下降1.4%只会进一步加剧下滑. ...2017年经济不太可能复苏;事实上,我认为即使油价上涨到每桶65 ~ 70美元,俄罗斯也不会出现经济增长. ...即使领导人设法避免削减政府雇员的工资,并通过取消最无用的支出来节省资金,被危机吓坏的普通民众和背负高利率的民众也不太可能增加个人支出。高油价将使卢布升值。这将导致利润下降。对于主要的原材料公司来说,从而减少了联邦预算的卢布收入。大多数商人预计经济会进一步停滞,不太可能投资新项目. ...如果油价上涨,当局将重新采取2010年的态度。当时,他们认为危机很快就会结束,因此立即放弃了开放企业条件或实施经济结构改革。俄罗斯将进入一个典型的停滞时期,其特征是缺乏变革的动力. ...由此可以得出一个简单而相当悲观的结论:俄罗斯受困于对大宗商品市场的依赖. ...俄罗斯没有现实的现代化计划,特别是考虑到它的孤立和缺乏潜在的经济伙伴。无论油价和卢布最终如何达到平衡,都不会导致质变. ...只有两种情况下,俄罗斯可以看到新的经济增长在未来几年. ...第一个要求油价持续上涨,就像之前在俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)执政期间所做的那样. ...然而,过去几十年的数据表明,油价必须每年上涨15%至20%才能恢复经济增长(在其他条件相同的情况下)。实际上,这意味着到2018年油价必须达到每桶80美元左右,到2020年不低于每桶110美元. ...这种情况可能会带来每年2%至4%的经济增长,并在2019 - 2020年使俄罗斯经济恢复到2008年的水平。然而,这种情况不太可能发生:目前的价格战以及页岩油和生物燃料等新能源供应的急剧增加,可能会有效地将价格限制在每桶60美元. ...还有第二个选择。与其实施必要的结构性改革,领导人不如通过恢复相对自由的贸易、将俄罗斯中部的大量土地归还给市场、免除新企业的税收、为外国投资提供强有力的保障,以及启动刺激需求的机制. ...,让在俄罗斯做生意变得更容易 政府可以采取的立场是,创造就业和经济增长暂时比征税更重要,让人们自己赚钱比让他们拿政府工资更好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
NO QUICK FIX
(By Vladislav Inozemtsev, director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies and Berthold Beitz Fellow with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). The Moscow Times, May 19, 2016, p. 5. Complete text:) This year got off to a bad start. Oil prices fell to below $30 per barrel, and a budget deficit of at least 5% seemed inevitable. But now Russia’s political elite are breathing a sigh of relief. Oil is up to more than $40 per barrel, and experts are predicting that prices are more likely to continue climbing than to collapse, as they did in winter. ... Of course, oil price trends cannot be forecast with any certainty. But financial officials recently stated that if oil remains between $40 and $50 per barrel, the economy will enter a "new reality." What does that mean? ... It refers to a course toward moderate belt-tightening - higher taxes and stricter collection of them - as well as limiting imports through protectionist measures. Government propaganda must be stepped up to convince the Russian people that scheming foreigners are the cause of their problems, not their leaders’ failed economic policy. ... This is simply "milking the economy." Oil and gas revenues will fall. They totaled 7.43 trillion rubles in 2014, dropped to 5.86 trillion rubles in 2015 and could fall to 4.5 trillion rubles in 2016. Therefore, the authorities will have to cut project investment, reduce funding to the regions and scale back financial incentives for state employees. ... That will lead to further decline in an economy kept afloat by government investment and purchases. Import volumes have dropped to half of their 2014 level, which means a decline in value-added tax revenues from the sale of those goods. ... The additional pressure that places on business, coupled with the reduction in state orders and the shrinking incomes of government employees, will lead to production declines. The authorities will use Central Bank emissions and quasi-emissions to limit spending from the government’s reserve fund, but that will not halt the recession. The 1.4% drop in gross domestic product during the first quarter of 2016 will only fuel further declines. ... Economic recovery is unlikely in 2017; in fact, I expect Russia will see no economic growth even if oil prices rise to as much as $65 to $70 per barrel. ... Even if leaders manage to avoid cutting salaries for state employees and save money by eliminating the most useless expenditures, a general population frightened by the crisis and burdened by high interest rates is unlikely to increase personal spending. Higher oil prices will strengthen the ruble. That will result in lower profits ... for major raw materials corporations, thus reducing ruble revenues to the federal budget. Most businesspeople will continue to expect further stagnation and will be unlikely to invest in new projects. ... If oil prices rise, the authorities will readopt their 2010 attitude. At that time, they expected an imminent end to the crisis and immediately gave up on liberalizing business conditions or implementing economic structural reforms. Russia will enter a period of classic stagnation, marked by a lack of incentive for change. ... This leads to a simple and rather pessimistic conclusion: Russia is trapped by its dependence on commodity markets. ... Russia has no realistic plan for modernization, particularly given its isolation and lack of potential economic partners. Regardless of how oil prices and the ruble finally reach equilibrium, no qualitative change will result. ... There are only two scenarios by which Russia could see renewed economic growth in the coming years. ... The first requires oil prices to continuously rise, as they previously did throughout President Vladimir Putin’s terms in office. ... However, data from the past decades indicates that oil prices must rise by 15% to 20% annually for economic growth to resume (all [other] things being equal). In practical terms, that means oil prices must reach approximately $80 per barrel by 2018 and no less than $110 per barrel by 2020. ... Such a scenario might provide economic growth of 2% to 4% per annum and return the Russian economy to 2008 levels by 2019 - 2020. However, that scenario is unlikely: The current price war and the sharp increase in supply from new forms of energy such as shale oil and biofuels could effectively cap prices at $60 per barrel. ... There is a second option. Rather than implementing the necessary structural reforms, leaders could make it easier to do business in Russia by reinstating relatively free trade, returning a significant volume of land in central Russia to the marketplace, waiving taxes for new businesses, creating potent guarantees for foreign investment and launching mechanisms for stimulating demand. ... The government could take the position that the creation of jobs and economic growth are temporarily more important than collecting taxes, and that it is better to let people earn money on their own than to put them on the government payroll.
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