科罗拉多州的恐惧和厌恶:援引最高法院的州争议管辖权来挑战大麻合法化实验

Chad Deveaux, Anne Mostad-Jensen
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在本条款中,我们主张各州可以援引最高法院的原始管辖权来质疑科罗拉多州和其他司法管辖区的大麻合法化。《宪法》赋予法院对国家间跨界妨害纠纷作出裁决的管辖权。这类诉讼曾经是法院案卷中相对常见的一部分。《清洁空气和水法》通过后,这类诉讼的数量急剧下降,该法院解除了建立和执行州际环境标准的历史角色。科罗拉多州将大麻引入州际贸易,重新唤醒了这一沉睡已久的宪法法律。与下游工业污染一样,科罗拉多州将大麻引入州际贸易所造成的跨界外部性也属于最高法院最初的管辖范围。在提出这一论点时,我们将我们的理论与内布拉斯加州和俄克拉荷马州向最高法院提出的申诉区分开来。内布拉斯加州和俄克拉何马州并没有以法院的跨境妨害判例为前提,而是寻求“强制执行……美国宪法第六条的最高条款。”他们认为科罗拉多州的冒险行为违反了联邦管制物质法案,应该被禁止。他们的联邦至上主张存在着无数致命的缺陷:他们缺乏代表联邦政府利益的立场,他们没有以援引法院原有管辖权所需的特殊性为损害辩护,他们对禁令救济的祈祷与反征用原则相冲突。相反,我们主张法院应以科斯定理为指导,将损害赔偿判给胜诉国。该定理指出,如果消除了交易成本,“各方将协商解决私人滋扰问题的有效办法”。该定理的实际应用是通过强加法律规则来实现的,这些法律规则最接近于在无交易成本的环境中解决争议的方式。要达到这样的结果,最好的办法是制定一项规定,要求妨害行为承担其造成的损害。如果迫使一个污染者将其污染成本内部化导致他破产,那么他的企业就不是最经济有效地利用财产的方式,他的利益应该服从于他邻居的利益。相反,如果污染者承担其企业的所有成本,并且仍然获得足够的利润来维持经营,那么他对土地的利用是最有效的。如果采用这种补救措施,市场将决定科罗拉多州冒险的成败,并将作为其他州决定是否值得效仿的指南。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking the Supreme Court's State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-Legalization Experiment
In this Article, we assert that States may invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge marijuana legalization in Colorado and other jurisdictions. The Constitution endows the Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate transboundary nuisance disputes between States. Such suits once comprised a relatively common part of the Court’s docket. The number of these actions fell dramatically following passage of the Clean Air and Water Acts, which relieved the Court of its historic role of establishing and enforcing interstate environmental standards. Colorado’s introduction of marijuana into interstate commerce has reawakened this long-dormant body of constitutional law. Like downstream industrial pollution, the transboundary externalities resulting from Colorado’s introduction of marijuana into interstate commerce fall within the ambit of the Court’s original jurisdiction. In making this argument, we distinguish our theory from the Complaint lodged by Nebraska and Oklahoma with the Supreme Court. Rather than premising their claim on the Court’s transboundary nuisance jurisprudence, Nebraska and Oklahoma seek to “enforce...the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.” They contend that Colorado’s venture violates the federal Controlled Substances Act and should be enjoined. Their federal-supremacy claim suffers from a myriad of fatal deficiencies: they lack standing to represent the federal government’s interests, they have not plead injury with the particularity required to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction, and their prayer for injunctive relief runs afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine. In contrast, we assert that the Court should award damages to a prevailing State, using the Coase Theorem as its guide. The Theorem states that if transaction costs are eliminated “parties will negotiate the efficient solution to private nuisance problems.” Real-world application of the theorem is attained by imposing legal rules that best approximate the way disputes would be resolved in a transaction-cost-free environment. Such an outcome is best effectuated by a rule charging the nuisance with the damages it causes. If compelling a polluter to internalize the cost of his pollution drives him out of business, then his enterprise was not the most economically efficient use of the property and his interests should yield to that of his neighbors. In contrast, if the polluter assumes responsibility for all the costs of his venture and still realizes a sufficient profit to stay in business, then his use of the land is most efficient. If this remedy is applied, the market will determine the success or failure of Colorado’s venture and will serve as a guide to other states in deciding whether it is worth emulating.
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