法律无知和信息强制规则

J. Verkerke
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引用次数: 9

摘要

人们往往不了解管理他们生活中最常见交易的法律规则。本文分析了对我们普遍的法律无知的一种常见的监管反应。令人惊讶的是,范围广泛的法律规则表面上的目的是诱导经验丰富的当事人起草明确的合同语言,以告知其合同伙伴有关管理特定交易的法律规则。然而,这种“强制法律信息”的目标往往无法实现,因为人们通常在不阅读和理解合同条款的情况下签署合同。理论上,法院可以设计出真正提供信息的强制信息规则。但是,由于认识到向许多缔约方告知复杂法律规则的尝试可能是徒劳的,本文还对鼓励经验丰富的缔约方起草明示合同条款的“强制条款”规则的几种替代理由进行了发展和批评。这些术语可以促进热衷比较的购物者、评论者和消费者倡导者的活动。全面的书面条款也可以促进事后法律清晰度,从而降低解决纠纷的成本。最后,免责条款允许当事方通过合同摆脱相对昂贵的解决争端的法律制度,而采用一种由非正式社会规范支配的制度。因此,条款强制规则鼓励成熟的起草方表明他们对规范管理关系的偏好,然后立法者通过决定是否执行免责条款来划定法律和规范之间的界限。这些强制条款规则在规范上的可取性尚不清楚,但我对这些替代理由的探索表明,假设明确的合同条款告知大多数不成熟的当事人的说法在概念上是贫乏的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules
People are often ignorant about the legal rules that govern the most common transactions in their lives. This Article analyzes one common regulatory response to our widespread legal ignorance. A surprisingly broad range of legal rules have the ostensible purpose of inducing sophisticated parties to draft express contract language that will inform their contractual partners about the legal rules governing a particular transaction. However, this “legal-information-forcing” objective often remains unrealized because people routinely sign contracts without reading and understanding their terms. In theory, courts could design information-forcing rules that would be truly informative. But recognizing the potential futility of attempts to inform many contracting parties about complex legal rules, this Article also develops and critiques several alternative justifications for “clause-forcing” rules that encourage sophisticated parties to draft express contract terms. Such terms could facilitate the activities of avid comparison shoppers, reviewers, and consumer advocates. Comprehensive written terms also may promote ex post legal clarity and thereby reduce the costs of resolving disputes. Finally, exculpatory clauses allow parties to contract out of the comparatively expensive legal system of dispute resolution in favor of a regime governed by informal social norms. On this account, clause-forcing rules encourage sophisticated drafting parties to signal their preference for a norm-governed relationship, and lawmakers then demarcate the boundary between law and norms by deciding whether to enforce exculpatory clauses. The normative desirability of these clause-forcing rules is unclear, but my exploration of these alternative justifications shows the conceptual poverty of accounts that presume express contract terms inform the majority of unsophisticated parties.
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