学校零容忍的宪法限度

IF 3 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
D. W. Black
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引用次数: 10

摘要

随着现代零容忍政策的引入,学校现在惩罚的行为比以往任何时候都多。但并不是所有的行为都是不好的。学校已经开除了那些把阿司匹林或指甲钳带到学校的学生,那些不知道书包里有钥匙链刀的学生,或者那些为了保证大家的安全而从其他学生那里拿走刀的学生。尽管这些例子受到质疑,法院还是支持暂停和驱逐这种善意、无害的行为。法院在没有任何解释的情况下认为,宪法对零容忍政策的适用没有任何有意义的限制。事实上,法院一直对宪法挑战不屑一顾,以至于大多数学者几乎都承认零容忍的合宪性,而是认为学校应该自愿接受政策变化。这是不正确的。虽然宪法赋予学校很大的自由裁量权来规范学生的行为,但这种自由裁量权并不包括完全剥夺学生的宪法权利和以学校认为合适的任何理由惩罚学生的权力。本文认为,实质正当程序的基本原则限制了零容忍。具体而言,实质性正当程序禁止州行为者(1)将处境迥异的学生视为相同的学生;(二)无视学生善意错误或者无辜的;(3)预设正当程序调查的答案,从而使听证会毫无意义。零容忍政策违反了这些原则,代表了国家权力的过度扩张,类似于最高法院在青少年司法相关领域推翻的那种国家过度扩张。为了遵守正当程序,州政府必须考虑学生的意图和罪责,以及相关行为造成的潜在危害。与传统观点相反,法院可以推翻那些未能采取这些步骤的零容忍政策,而无需重新制定宪法原则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools
With the introduction of modern zero tolerance policies, schools now punish much more behavior than they ever have before. But not all the behavior is bad. Schools have expelled the student who brings aspirin or fingernail clippers to campus, who does not know that a keychain knife in his backpack, or who reports having taken away a knife from another student in order to keep everyone safe. Despite challenges to these examples, courts have upheld the suspension and expulsion of this good-faith, innocuous behavior. With little explanation, courts have opined that the Constitution places no meaningful limit on the application of zero tolerance policies. Indeed, courts have been so dismissive of constitutional challenges that most scholars all but concede the constitutionality of zero tolerance, arguing instead that schools should voluntarily adopt policy changes. This is incorrect. Although the constitution confers significant discretion on schools to regulate student behavior, that discretion does not include the authority to entirely strip students of their constitutional rights and punish them for any reason a school deems fit. This Article argues that fundamental principles of substantive due process limit zero tolerance. In particular, substantive due process prohibits state actors from (1) treating substantially dissimilarly situated students as though they are the same; (2) disregarding a student’s good-faith mistakes or innocence; and (3) presupposing the answers to due process inquiries so as to render hearings meaningless. Zero tolerance policies breach each of these principles and represent a broad overreach of state power, akin to the sort of state overreaching that the Supreme Court has struck down in related areas of juvenile justice. To comply with due process, the state must consider students’ intent and culpability, along with the potential harm posed by the behavior at issue. Contrary to conventional wisdom, courts can strike down zero tolerance policies that fail to take these steps without re-crafting constitutional doctrine.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: In January 1917, Professor Henry J. Fletcher launched the Minnesota Law Review with lofty aspirations: “A well-conducted law review . . . ought to do something to develop the spirit of statesmanship as distinguished from a dry professionalism. It ought at the same time contribute a little something to the systematic growth of the whole law.” For the next forty years, in conjunction with the Minnesota State Bar Association, the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School directed the work of student editors of the Law Review. Despite their initial oversight and vision, however, the faculty gradually handed the editorial mantle over to law students.
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