为什么非原旨主义不能成为背离休会任命条款原意的理由

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Michael B. Rappaport
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引用次数: 1

摘要

宪法规定,官员的任命必须经过总统提名和参议院同意的程序,但休会任命条款允许总统在参议院休会期间单独进行临时任命。这样,即使参议院无法确认被提名人,总统也可以填补职位空缺。一个关键问题是总统的休会任命权限有多大。在2005年的一篇文章中,我认为该条款最初的含义是赋予总统狭隘的权力。然而,行政部门对该条款的解释要宽泛得多。如果行政部门的解释与最初的含义不一致,那么它的辩护者如何寻求为其辩护?主要的方法是争辩说,各种非原旨主义的考虑表明,应该遵循行政长官的广义解释。在本文中,我考察了可能提出的主要的非原旨主义论点,并表明它们都没有提供偏离原意的有说服力的理由。反对遵循条款原意的常见论点是基于现行的宪政主义。在这种做法下,最初的宪法被视为一份旧的、可能过时的文件,法官被视为有权更新其条款,以考虑到现代价值观和环境。而且很明显,自18世纪末以来,有关任命的情况已经发生了变化,当时过时的交通方式通常导致参议院休会6到9个月。但这些情况的变化要求缩小休会任命的权限,而不是扩大休会任命的权限。在一个有飞机的世界里,参议院的休会时间更短,因此不太需要允许总统单方面任命。此外,现代任命做法表明,任命需要很长时间,平均提名需要4个月,任命需要5至6个月。这一证据表明,10天或30天的短暂休会,只是普通任命程序的一小部分,不能成为绕过参议院确认要求的理由。背离原意的最常见也可能是最有力的论据是基于历史实践的。为行政部门对该条款的看法辩护的人认为,政治部门遵循了一种允许广泛休会任命权力的做法,这种做法要么得到了立法机关的同意,要么得到了默许。本文回顾了休会任命的做法,并认为这种说法是错误的。它表明,国会在1863年和1940年通过的法规拒绝了行政部门的广泛观点。然而,行政部门错误地解释了后一项法规,使其具有广泛的权力。近年来,随着行政部门更积极地行使休会任命权力,立法院通过举行形式会议来抵制这种权力。但是,即使行政部门对该条款的解释得到历史实践的支持,我认为这也不能成为偏离其原意的理由。国会或参议院的同意或默许不足以成为背离宪法的理由。如果参议院同意扩大总统的休会任命权力,那么从总统和参议院的角度来看,该协议可能是一种可取的安排。但宪法的目的是保护人民,而不是促进政治分支的利益,参议院的同意是这种保护的一个重要方面。注:这篇文章的初稿写于2013年夏天,在诺埃尔·坎宁案的摘要提交给最高法院之前。2013年10月,司法部副部长提交了简报,其中包括大量此前未被披露的休会期间任命。这篇文章随后被修改,以考虑到这些新发现的休会任命。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Why Nonoriginalism Does Not Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause
The Constitution requires officers to be appointed through a process of presidential nomination and senatorial consent, but the Recess Appointments Clause allows the President alone to make temporary appointments during Senate recesses. In this way, the President can fill offices even if the Senate is not available to confirm a nominee. A key question is how broad the President’s recess appointment authority is. In a 2005 article, I argued that the original meaning of the Clause provides narrow authority to the President. The executive branch, however, interprets the Clause much more broadly. If the executive’s interpretation is inconsistent with the original meaning, then how do its defenders seek to justify it? The main method has been to argue that various nonoriginalist considerations indicate that the executive’s broad interpretation should be followed. In this article, I examine the principal nonoriginalist arguments that might be made and show that none of them provides a persuasive case for departing from the original meaning. A common argument made against following the original meaning of a provision is based on living constitutionalism. Under this approach, the original Constitution is seen as an old, potentially outdated document and judges are viewed as having the power to update its provisions to take into account modern values and circumstances. And it is clearly true that the circumstances governing appointments have changed since the late 18th century, when antiquated transportation methods generally led the Senate to take recesses of between 6 to 9 months. But these changes in circumstances argue for narrower, not broader recess appointment authority. In a world with airplanes, Senate recesses are shorter and therefore there is less need to allow the President to make unilateral appointments. Moreover, modern appointment practices indicate that appointments take a long time, with on average nominations taking 4 months and appointments taking 5 to 6 months. This evidence suggests that short recesses of 10 or 30 days, which delay appointments by only a fraction of the ordinary appointment process, do not justify bypassing the senatorial confirmation requirement. The most common and probably the strongest argument for departing from the original meaning is based on historical practice. Defenders of the executive branch’s view of the Clause argue that the political branches have followed a practice allowing broad recess appointment power and that this practice has either been agreed to or acquiesced in by the legislature. This Article reviews the recess appointment practice and argues that this account of the practice is mistaken. It shows that Congress has passed statutes in 1863 and 1940 that have rejected the executive’s broad view. The executive, however, has mistakenly interpreted the latter statute to allow it broad authority. As the executive has asserted recess appointment power more aggressively in recent years, the legislative houses have resisted this authority by holding pro forma sessions. But even if the executive’s interpretation of the Clause were supported by historical practice, I argue that would not justify departing from the original meaning. The Congress or Senate’s consent or acquiescence is insufficient to justify departing from the Constitution. If the Senate consented to an expansion of the President’s recess appointment power, that agreement might be a desirable arrangement from the perspective of the President and the Senate. But the purpose of the Constitution is to protect the people, not to further the interests of the political branches, and senatorial consent is an essential aspect of such protection. Note: The first draft of this article was written in the summer of 2013, before the briefs were submitted to the Supreme Court in the Noel Canning case. In October, 2013 the Solicitor General filed its brief, which included a large number of intrasession recess appointments that had not previously been uncovered. This article was then revised to take account of these newly uncovered recess appointments.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
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0.00%
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期刊介绍: The Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy is published three times annually by the Harvard Society for Law & Public Policy, Inc., an organization of Harvard Law School students. The Journal is one of the most widely circulated student-edited law reviews and the nation’s leading forum for conservative and libertarian legal scholarship. The late Stephen Eberhard and former Senator and Secretary of Energy E. Spencer Abraham founded the journal twenty-eight years ago and many journal alumni have risen to prominent legal positions in the government and at the nation’s top law firms.
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