{"title":"超越加州公务员退休基金:公共养老基金在公司治理中发展作用的调查证据","authors":"Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1010330","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We survey public pension funds and report on their litigation and non-litigation activism. We report that activity levels vary, dramatically. Although some funds engage in a substantial amount of governance activity, a significant number do little or nothing. Public pension funds engage in a very limited spectrum of non-litigation activities, involving primarily low visibility activities such as participation in corporate governance organizations or withholding votes from a management nominee. Funds with more assets under management are far more active in non-litigation activism. Similarly, funds that devote more resources generally to in-house activities are also more active in non-litigation activism. A marked difference exists for litigation activism. Public pension fund participate much more extensively in shareholder litigation than in other governance activities. Despite the importance of asset size for participation levels, we also find that for litigation-related activism, smaller funds participate with equal frequency.","PeriodicalId":47503,"journal":{"name":"Vanderbilt Law Review","volume":"61 1","pages":"315"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2007-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"47","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance\",\"authors\":\"Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.1010330\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We survey public pension funds and report on their litigation and non-litigation activism. We report that activity levels vary, dramatically. Although some funds engage in a substantial amount of governance activity, a significant number do little or nothing. Public pension funds engage in a very limited spectrum of non-litigation activities, involving primarily low visibility activities such as participation in corporate governance organizations or withholding votes from a management nominee. Funds with more assets under management are far more active in non-litigation activism. Similarly, funds that devote more resources generally to in-house activities are also more active in non-litigation activism. A marked difference exists for litigation activism. Public pension fund participate much more extensively in shareholder litigation than in other governance activities. Despite the importance of asset size for participation levels, we also find that for litigation-related activism, smaller funds participate with equal frequency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47503,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Vanderbilt Law Review\",\"volume\":\"61 1\",\"pages\":\"315\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-09-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"47\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Vanderbilt Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1010330\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Vanderbilt Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1010330","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance
We survey public pension funds and report on their litigation and non-litigation activism. We report that activity levels vary, dramatically. Although some funds engage in a substantial amount of governance activity, a significant number do little or nothing. Public pension funds engage in a very limited spectrum of non-litigation activities, involving primarily low visibility activities such as participation in corporate governance organizations or withholding votes from a management nominee. Funds with more assets under management are far more active in non-litigation activism. Similarly, funds that devote more resources generally to in-house activities are also more active in non-litigation activism. A marked difference exists for litigation activism. Public pension fund participate much more extensively in shareholder litigation than in other governance activities. Despite the importance of asset size for participation levels, we also find that for litigation-related activism, smaller funds participate with equal frequency.
期刊介绍:
Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc is an online forum designed to advance scholarly discussion. En Banc offers professors, practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law Review. En Banc permits extended discussion of our articles in a way that maintains academic integrity and provides authors with a quicker approach to publication. When reexamining a case “en banc” an appellate court operates at its highest level, with all judges present and participating “on the bench.” We chose the name “En Banc” to capture this spirit of focused review and provide a forum for further dialogue where all can be present and participate.