被遗忘的安全权利

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Luke M. Milligan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

美国的监控手段遵循“先用后管”的一般原则。虽然“先用后管”的一般原则被广泛理解,但其社会成本尚未意识到。在“初始使用”和“监管”之间,政府行为者可以相对不受惩罚地使用有害的调查技术。假设某一技术最终受到监管,由于有条件豁免(针对行为人)和排除规则的善意例外(针对任何由此产生的证据),其管制前用途实际上不受任何此类监管的约束。这种有罪不罚的预期导致政府战略行为者在管制前时期频繁和任意使用有害的调查技术。监管延迟往往会持续很长时间(通常是十年或更长时间),这在很大程度上归因于执法部门的拖延方法(通过主张特权、欺骗性的资金请求和刑事调查的战略顺序)。虽然监管延迟的社会成本很高、不断上升且难以控制,但缩短监管延迟的传统努力(通过加速立法和更广泛的第三条地位规则)已被证明是无效的。本文介绍了一种控制监管延迟成本的替代方法:在第四修正案的“安全”文本中找到“受保护”和“免于恐惧”的权利。法院和大多数评论家对第四修正案的解释仅仅是为了保障“免于”不合理搜查和扣押的权利。然而,对“确保安全”一词的研究表明,该修正案可以被更广泛地解读:保障受“保护”免受无理搜查和扣押的权利,并可能保障对此类政府行为“免于恐惧”的权利。对“安全”的这些广泛解读可以从“安全”的原意、修正案的结构以及建国时期关于搜查和扣押的论述中找到支持。“受保护”和“免于恐惧”的权利可以通过司法制定的规则得到充分保障,以防止政府“采用”一种构成不受管制和不合理的搜查或扣押的方法。第四条修正案中反对“收养”的规定的结果是更早地对隐蔽调查手段的合宪性提出质疑。更早地诉诸法院会招致更早的司法监管,这反过来又有助于遏制监管延误带来的成本上升。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Forgotten Right to Be Secure
Surveillance methods in the United States operate under the general principle that “use precedes regulation.” While the general principle of “use precedes regulation” is widely understood, its societal costs have yet to be realized. In the period between “initial use” and “regulation,” government actors can utilize harmful investigative techniques with relative impunity. Assuming a given technique is ultimately subjected to regulation, its preregulation uses are practically exempted from any such regulation due to qualified immunity (for the actor) and the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception (for any resulting evidence). This expectation of impunity invites strategic government actors to make frequent and arbitrary uses of harmful investigative techniques during preregulation periods. Regulatory delays tend to run long (often a decade or more) and are attributable in no small part to the stalling methods of law enforcement (through assertions of privilege, deceptive funding requests, and strategic sequencing of criminal investigations). While the societal costs of regulatory delay are high, rising, and difficult to control, the conventional efforts to shorten regulatory delays (through expedited legislation and broader rules of Article III standing) have proved ineffective. This Article introduces an alternative method to control the costs of regulatory delay: locating rights to be “protected” and “free from fear” in the “to be secure” text of the Fourth Amendment. Courts and most commentators interpret the Fourth Amendment to safeguard a mere right to be “spared” unreasonable searches and seizures. A study of the “to be secure” text, however, suggests that the Amendment can be read more broadly: to guarantee a right to be “protected” against unreasonable searches and seizures, and possibly a right to be “free from fear” against such government action. Support for these broad readings of “to be secure” is found in the original meaning of “secure,” the Amendment’s structure, and founding-era discourse regarding searches and seizures. The rights to be “protected” and “free from fear” can be adequately safeguarded by a judicially-created rule against government "adoption" of a method that constitutes an unregulated and unreasonable search or seizure. The upshot of this Fourth Amendment rule against “adoption” is earlier standing to challenge the constitutionality of concealed investigative techniques. Earlier access to courts invites earlier judicial regulation which, in turn, helps curb the rising costs of regulatory delay.
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来源期刊
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期刊介绍: Hastings College of the Law was founded in 1878 as the first law department of the University of California, and today is one of the top-rated law schools in the United States. Its alumni span the globe and are among the most respected lawyers, judges and business leaders today. Hastings was founded in 1878 as the first law department of the University of California and is one of the most exciting and vibrant legal education centers in the nation. Our faculty are nationally renowned as both teachers and scholars.
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