企业超级政治行动委员会捐款是浪费还是自我交易?近距离观察

J. Leahy
{"title":"企业超级政治行动委员会捐款是浪费还是自我交易?近距离观察","authors":"J. Leahy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2304852","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Management has exclusive domain over a corporation's day-to-day affairs; shareholders play no role in ordinary business decisions. Thus, in a post-Citizens United world, management may cause a corporation to contribute to a Super PAC without any shareholder input. If a shareholder discovers the contribution and objects, her only options under state corporation law are to elect a new board, sell her shares or sue management for breach of fiduciary duty – i.e., \"vote, sell or sue.\"Unfortunately, for most shareholders of publicly traded corporations, neither \"vote\" nor \"sell\" is an effective response a Super PAC contribution. Ousting the board is not an option due to the collective action problem. Selling one's shares also is no remedy because the stock market will already know of and have reacted to the contribution.But what about \"sue\"? Many corporate law scholars have summarily rejected this option, urging that management's decision to make the contribution would be protected by the business judgment rule. Yet, no such scholar has thoroughly analyzed this issue.Bucking this trend, two authors recently have urged that shareholders could successfully sue to challenge a corporate Super PAC contribution. However, these commentaries have been ignored in the law reviews and summarily panned in the blogosphere, leaving the idea largely unexamined. This Article remedies that oversight.After close scrutiny, one of the two theories proffered in these two papers – waste – is a sure loser in all but the most extreme circumstances. There is simply no good argument that a typical corporate Super PAC contribution meets the nearly-impossible-to-satisfy waste standard.By contrast, the second theory – self-dealing – may be viable if the candidate supported by the Super PAC advocates policies that favor the financial interests of management over those of most Americans. Yet, although self-dealing is a better theory than waste, it is nonetheless uncertain to succeed due to the attenuated causal connection between any Super PAC contribution and any potential financial benefit to management.As such, a shareholder derivative lawsuit challenging a Super PAC contribution faces long odds – unless, perhaps, she advances a theory other than waste or self-dealing.","PeriodicalId":82026,"journal":{"name":"Missouri law review","volume":"79 1","pages":"283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look\",\"authors\":\"J. Leahy\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2304852\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Management has exclusive domain over a corporation's day-to-day affairs; shareholders play no role in ordinary business decisions. Thus, in a post-Citizens United world, management may cause a corporation to contribute to a Super PAC without any shareholder input. If a shareholder discovers the contribution and objects, her only options under state corporation law are to elect a new board, sell her shares or sue management for breach of fiduciary duty – i.e., \\\"vote, sell or sue.\\\"Unfortunately, for most shareholders of publicly traded corporations, neither \\\"vote\\\" nor \\\"sell\\\" is an effective response a Super PAC contribution. Ousting the board is not an option due to the collective action problem. Selling one's shares also is no remedy because the stock market will already know of and have reacted to the contribution.But what about \\\"sue\\\"? Many corporate law scholars have summarily rejected this option, urging that management's decision to make the contribution would be protected by the business judgment rule. Yet, no such scholar has thoroughly analyzed this issue.Bucking this trend, two authors recently have urged that shareholders could successfully sue to challenge a corporate Super PAC contribution. However, these commentaries have been ignored in the law reviews and summarily panned in the blogosphere, leaving the idea largely unexamined. This Article remedies that oversight.After close scrutiny, one of the two theories proffered in these two papers – waste – is a sure loser in all but the most extreme circumstances. There is simply no good argument that a typical corporate Super PAC contribution meets the nearly-impossible-to-satisfy waste standard.By contrast, the second theory – self-dealing – may be viable if the candidate supported by the Super PAC advocates policies that favor the financial interests of management over those of most Americans. Yet, although self-dealing is a better theory than waste, it is nonetheless uncertain to succeed due to the attenuated causal connection between any Super PAC contribution and any potential financial benefit to management.As such, a shareholder derivative lawsuit challenging a Super PAC contribution faces long odds – unless, perhaps, she advances a theory other than waste or self-dealing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":82026,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Missouri law review\",\"volume\":\"79 1\",\"pages\":\"283\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-07-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Missouri law review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2304852\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Missouri law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2304852","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

管理层对公司的日常事务拥有专有权;股东在普通的商业决策中没有任何作用。因此,在后联合公民时代,管理层可能会让公司在没有任何股东参与的情况下向超级政治行动委员会捐款。如果股东发现出资并反对,根据国家公司法,她唯一的选择是选举一个新的董事会,出售她的股份或起诉管理层违反信托义务——即“投票、出售或起诉”。不幸的是,对于大多数上市公司的股东来说,“投票”或“出售”都不是对超级政治行动委员会捐款的有效回应。由于集体行动问题,罢免董事会不是一个选择。卖出自己的股票也不是补救办法,因为股票市场已经知道并对自己的贡献做出了反应。那“sue”呢?许多公司法学者断然拒绝了这一选择,他们敦促说,管理层作出贡献的决定将受到商业判断规则的保护。然而,还没有学者对这一问题进行深入的分析。与这一趋势相反,两位作者最近敦促股东可以成功地起诉企业超级政治行动委员会的捐款。然而,这些评论在法律评论中被忽略,并在博客圈中被草率地抨击,使得这个想法在很大程度上没有得到检验。本文弥补了这一疏忽。经过仔细研究,这两篇论文中提出的两种理论之一——浪费理论——除了在最极端的情况下,在所有情况下都肯定是失败的。根本没有充分的理由说,典型的企业超级政治行动委员会捐款达到了几乎不可能达到的浪费标准。相比之下,如果超级政治行动委员会支持的候选人主张的政策有利于管理层的经济利益,而不是大多数美国人的利益,那么第二种理论——自我交易——可能是可行的。然而,尽管自利交易是一种比浪费更好的理论,但由于超级政治行动委员会的任何捐款与管理层的任何潜在财务利益之间的因果关系减弱,因此成功与否仍不确定。因此,对超级政治行动委员会捐款发起股东衍生诉讼的可能性很小——除非她提出了一种理论,而不是浪费或自我交易。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look
Management has exclusive domain over a corporation's day-to-day affairs; shareholders play no role in ordinary business decisions. Thus, in a post-Citizens United world, management may cause a corporation to contribute to a Super PAC without any shareholder input. If a shareholder discovers the contribution and objects, her only options under state corporation law are to elect a new board, sell her shares or sue management for breach of fiduciary duty – i.e., "vote, sell or sue."Unfortunately, for most shareholders of publicly traded corporations, neither "vote" nor "sell" is an effective response a Super PAC contribution. Ousting the board is not an option due to the collective action problem. Selling one's shares also is no remedy because the stock market will already know of and have reacted to the contribution.But what about "sue"? Many corporate law scholars have summarily rejected this option, urging that management's decision to make the contribution would be protected by the business judgment rule. Yet, no such scholar has thoroughly analyzed this issue.Bucking this trend, two authors recently have urged that shareholders could successfully sue to challenge a corporate Super PAC contribution. However, these commentaries have been ignored in the law reviews and summarily panned in the blogosphere, leaving the idea largely unexamined. This Article remedies that oversight.After close scrutiny, one of the two theories proffered in these two papers – waste – is a sure loser in all but the most extreme circumstances. There is simply no good argument that a typical corporate Super PAC contribution meets the nearly-impossible-to-satisfy waste standard.By contrast, the second theory – self-dealing – may be viable if the candidate supported by the Super PAC advocates policies that favor the financial interests of management over those of most Americans. Yet, although self-dealing is a better theory than waste, it is nonetheless uncertain to succeed due to the attenuated causal connection between any Super PAC contribution and any potential financial benefit to management.As such, a shareholder derivative lawsuit challenging a Super PAC contribution faces long odds – unless, perhaps, she advances a theory other than waste or self-dealing.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信