开明的监管俘获

IF 1.1 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
D. Thaw
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引用次数: 12

摘要

监管俘获通常会让人联想到私人利益对政府行为施加过度影响,以牺牲公众利益为代价推进自己的议程的负面形象。然而,在某些情况下,这种传统智慧完全是倒退的。本文探讨了第一个可验证的案例,该案例取自医疗保健网络安全,其中监管捕获使监管机构能够利用私人专业知识专门推进公共目标。将这个例子与其他利用行业专业知识的尝试进行比较,可以发现一组特征,在这些特征下,监管捕获可以用于公共利益。这些措施包括:1)由私人利益和“减少偏见”主题专家组成的咨询委员会通过立法授权的建议;2)放宽委员会行动的程序限制,防止内部委员会被俘获;3)对私人政党代表来说,参与委员会的机会不仅仅是促进他们自己利益的机会。本文根据这些特点提出建议,说明立法机构如何以及何时可以努力在其他行业复制这一成功,以提高监管过程的合法性和有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Enlightened Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture generally evokes negative images of private interests exerting excessive influence on government action to advance their own agendas at the expense of the public interest. There are some cases, however, where this conventional wisdom is exactly backwards. This Article explores the first verifiable case, taken from healthcare cybersecurity, where regulatory capture enabled regulators to harness private expertise to advance exclusively public goals. Comparing this example to other attempts at harnessing industry expertise reveals a set of characteristics under which regulatory capture can be used in the public interest. These include: 1) legislatively-mandated adoption of recommendations by an advisory committee comprising private interests and "reduced-bias" subject matter experts; 2) relaxed procedural constraints for committee action to prevent internal committee capture; 3) and opportunities for committee participation to be worthwhile for representatives of private parties beyond the mere opportunity to advance their own interests. This Article presents recommendations based on those characteristics as to how and when legislatures may endeavor to replicate this success in other industries to improve both the legitimacy and efficacy of the regulatory process.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Washington Law Review is a student-run and student-edited scholarly legal journal at the University of Washington School of Law. Inaugurated in 1919, it is the first legal journal published in the Pacific Northwest. Today, the Law Review publishes Articles and Comments of national and regional interest four times per year.
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