习俗、规范实践和法律

IF 1.8 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Duke Law Journal Pub Date : 2012-11-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2294081

G. Postema

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引用次数: 26

摘要

具有法律约束力的习惯通常从两个独立的要素来分析:行为的规律性(usus)和从事法律要求的行为的行为人的信念(opinio juris)。这种附加的风俗观念是有严重缺陷的。本文认为，我们必须放弃加性概念，代之以一种对习俗的解释，这种解释将法律上相关的习俗理解为规范，这些规范来自于嵌入在以相互交织的预期和相互关联的行为为特征的丰富社会互动背景中的话语规范实践。有人认为，具有法律约束力的习俗的标志不是对行为规则的信念或信念，而是将有意义的行为整合到法律认可的理由和论点的网络中。

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Custom, Normative Practice, and the Law

Legally binding custom is conventionally analyzed in terms of two independent elements: regularities of behavior (usus) and convictions of actors engaging in the behavior that it is legally required (opinio juris). This additive conception of custom is deeply flawed. This essay argues that we must abandon the additive conception and replace it with an account of custom that understands legally relevant customs as norms that arise from discursive normative practices embedded in rich contexts of social interaction characterized by intermeshing anticipations and interconnected conduct. The hallmark of legally binding customs, it is argued, is not the addition of belief or conviction to behavioral regularities, but rather the integration of meaningful conduct into a web of legally recognized reasons and arguments.

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来源期刊

Duke Law Journal LAW-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.