《反禁令法》与联邦-州管辖权重叠问题

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
James E. Pfander, N. Nazemi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自从1789年国会决定将州法院也可以审理的案件的管辖权授予下级联邦法院以来,这个国家就面临着如何在两个法院系统之间分配决策权的问题。1793年颁布的《联邦反禁令法》(AIA)是这一并行法的核心,旨在限制联邦法院禁止州法院诉讼的权力。费利克斯·法兰克福法官决定性地塑造了我们对这些限制的理解,他在Toucey诉纽约人寿保险公司案中得出结论,该法规绝对禁止任何此类禁令。联邦-州并行的许多法则都是基于Toucey的描述。在这篇文章中,我们对AIA提出了一个新的解释,挑战了之前的解释。我们指出,AIA的起草背景是18世纪的实践,目的是限制“原始的”联邦衡平法对正在进行的州法院诉讼程序的干预,但允许联邦法院自由地授予禁令性质的“辅助”救济,以保护联邦管辖权并使联邦法令生效。正是这种辅助性权力导致了一些例外的出现,这些例外遭到了图西的谴责,而国会在1948年的立法中恢复了这些例外。我们利用对该法1793年和1948年版本的新解释来解决目前管辖权重叠的问题。除此之外,我们对备受诟病的鲁克-费尔德曼学说提出了新的问题;为法官制定的公平约束原则提供新的法定替代;并提出新的方法来协调像伯福德和科罗拉多河这样的弃权原则。奇怪的是,这些(以及其他)谜题的答案都隐藏在1793年起草者的谨慎决定中,他们只限制“禁令令状”的发布,并在其他方面保持联邦衡平法权力不变。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of Federal-State Jurisdictional Overlap
Ever since Congress decided in 1789 to confer jurisdiction on lower federal courts over matters that the state courts could also hear, the nation has faced the problem of how to allocate decision-making authority between the two court systems. Central to this body of concurrency law, the federal Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 (AIA) was enacted to limit the power of the federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings. Justice Felix Frankfurter decisively shaped our understanding of those limits, concluding in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Company that the statute absolutely barred any such injunction. Much of the law of federal–state concurrency has been predicated on Toucey’s account. In this Article, we offer a new account of the AIA that challenges prior interpretations. Rather than a flat ban on injunctive relief, we show that the AIA was drafted against the backdrop of eighteenth century practice to restrict “original” federal equitable interference in ongoing state court proceedings but to leave the federal courts free to grant “ancillary” relief in the nature of an injunction, to protect federal jurisdiction and to effectuate federal decrees. It was this ancillary power that gave rise to the exceptions that Toucey decried and Congress restored in its 1948 codification. We draw on our new account of the 1793 and 1948 versions of the Act to address current problems of jurisdictional overlap. Among other things, we raise new questions about the much-maligned Rooker-Feldman doctrine; offer a new statutory substitute for the judge-made doctrine of equitable restraint; and suggest new ways to harmonize such abstention doctrines as Burford and Colorado River. Curiously, answers to these (and other) puzzles were hiding in the careful decision of the 1793 drafters to restrict only the issuance of “writs of injunction” and otherwise to leave federal equitable power intact.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
6.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Texas Law Review is a national and international leader in legal scholarship. Texas Law Review is an independent journal, edited and published entirely by students at the University of Texas School of Law. Our seven issues per year contain articles by professors, judges, and practitioners; reviews of important recent books from recognized experts, essays, commentaries; and student written notes. Texas Law Review is currently the ninth most cited legal periodical in federal and state cases in the United States and the thirteenth most cited by legal journals.
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