联邦制的竞选财政保障

Garrick B. Pursley
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文首次系统地阐述了竞选资金与联邦制之间的关系。联邦制是宪法结构的一个基本特征,其稳定性取决于政治机制。各州及其在国会、联邦机构、政党、政府间游说团体和其他政治论坛中的倡导者和代表共同努力,检查联邦政府对州政府的干预。整个联邦制的规范理论都依赖于这样一个假设,即这种政治保障制度在后台有效地发挥作用。但联邦制和宪法理论文献缺乏对戏剧性政治变化对亲联邦制政治动态的影响的严格描述。现在建立这个账户尤为及时。只有当国家保持重要的政治影响力时,政治保障措施才会起作用。但是,正如最近的选举生动地表明的那样,联合公民创造了一类新的政治操作者——超级政治行动委员会就是其中的象征——他们潜在的政治影响力可能是无限的。本文的论点是,超级政治行动委员会有能力破坏联邦制的所有传统政治保障,将各州推到政治影响力等级的足够低的位置,从而极大地重塑我们的政府体系。这突出表明,除了对民主代表权的影响外,联合公民可能在多大程度上产生长期的结构性后果,这一点并未得到充分认识。这些发展对联邦制理论具有重要的规范意义——至少,它们需要重新审视作为众多规范主张核心的共同假设,即国家政治进程是国家自卫的持久渠道。它们还提出了有关竞选资金原则的新规范主张。如果维持联邦制是一个令人信服的政府利益,那么联邦制问题可能证明新的竞选支出限制是合理的,尽管有《第一修正案》和“联合公民”案的推理,否则似乎会阻碍进一步的改革。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism
This article provides the first systematic account of the relationship between campaign finance and federalism. Federalism — a fundamental characteristic of the constitutional structure — depends for its stability on political mechanisms. States and their advocates and representatives in Congress, federal agencies, political parties, intergovernmental lobbying groups, and other political forums work together to check federal interference with state governments. Entire normative theories of federalism depend on the assumption that this system of political safeguards is working effectively in the background. But the federalism and constitutional theory literatures lack a rigorous account of the effects of dramatic political change on pro-federalism political dynamics. Building that account is particularly timely now. Political safeguards work only if states retain significant political influence. But, as recent elections vividly demonstrate, Citizens United has created a new class of political operators — of which Super PACs are emblematic — whose potential political influence may be limitless. This article’s thesis is that Super PACs have the capacity to undermine all conventional political safeguards of federalism, pushing states far enough down the hierarchy of political influence to dramatically reshape the our system of government. This highlights the underappreciated extent to which Citizens United may have long-term structural consequences other than its effects on democratic representation. These developments have significant normative implications for federalism theory — at a minimum, they require reexamining the common assumption, central to numerous normative claims, that national political process is a durable channel for state self-defense. They also suggest new normative claims concerning campaign finance doctrine. If sustaining federalism is a compelling governmental interest, then federalism problems may justify new campaign spending restrictions despite the First Amendment and the reasoning of Citizens United, which otherwise appear to preclude further reforms.
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