{"title":"能力平均主义与道德自我","authors":"J. M. Alexander","doi":"10.2143/EP.10.1.503868","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum advocate that a person’s quality of life and equal standing in society should be evaluated in terms of capabilities rather than utility, income or resources. In this article, I critically examine the concept of the person that underpins the capability approach. I argue that the ideal of equality of capability articulates a ‘nonutilitarian’ and ‘non-liberal’ view of the self.","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"10 1","pages":"3-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.10.1.503868","citationCount":"33","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Capability Egalitarianism and Moral Selfhood\",\"authors\":\"J. M. Alexander\",\"doi\":\"10.2143/EP.10.1.503868\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum advocate that a person’s quality of life and equal standing in society should be evaluated in terms of capabilities rather than utility, income or resources. In this article, I critically examine the concept of the person that underpins the capability approach. I argue that the ideal of equality of capability articulates a ‘nonutilitarian’ and ‘non-liberal’ view of the self.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54109,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ethical Perspectives\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"3-21\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.10.1.503868\",\"citationCount\":\"33\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ethical Perspectives\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.10.1.503868\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethical Perspectives","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.10.1.503868","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum advocate that a person’s quality of life and equal standing in society should be evaluated in terms of capabilities rather than utility, income or resources. In this article, I critically examine the concept of the person that underpins the capability approach. I argue that the ideal of equality of capability articulates a ‘nonutilitarian’ and ‘non-liberal’ view of the self.
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