{"title":"不杀人的宪法权利","authors":"Mark L. Rienzi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2025281","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Federal and state governments participate in and/or permit a variety of different types of killings. These include military operations, capital punishment, assisted suicide, abortion and self-defense or defense of others. In a pluralistic society, it is no surprise that there will be some members of the population who refuse to participate in some or all of these types of killings. The question of how governments should treat such refusals is older than the Republic itself. Since colonial times, the answer to this question has been driven largely by statutory protections, with the Constitution playing a smaller role, particularly since the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.This Article offers a new answer to this very old question: a federal constitutional right not to kill, protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court’s substantive due process cases suggest that certain unenumerated rights can qualify for constitutional protection when they are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.” This Article reviews the government’s historical ability to force unwilling citizens to participate in government-sanctioned killings across a variety of contexts, and concludes that the right not to kill passes the Court’s stated tests, and does so even better than previously recognized rights. The right not to kill also fits squarely within the zone of individual decision making protected by the Court’s decisions in Casey and Lawrence.Recognition of a constitutional right, of course, does not mean that the right can never be infringed. Rather, as with most rights, the constitutional right not to kill can presumably be trumped by a sufficiently compelling government interest and a narrowly tailored law. In the vast majority of cases, however, the government will not be able to meet this test, leaving individuals free to decide for themselves whether they are willing to participate in government-sanctioned killings.","PeriodicalId":81162,"journal":{"name":"Emory law journal","volume":"62 1","pages":"121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2025281","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Constitutional Right Not to Kill\",\"authors\":\"Mark L. Rienzi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2025281\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Federal and state governments participate in and/or permit a variety of different types of killings. These include military operations, capital punishment, assisted suicide, abortion and self-defense or defense of others. In a pluralistic society, it is no surprise that there will be some members of the population who refuse to participate in some or all of these types of killings. The question of how governments should treat such refusals is older than the Republic itself. Since colonial times, the answer to this question has been driven largely by statutory protections, with the Constitution playing a smaller role, particularly since the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.This Article offers a new answer to this very old question: a federal constitutional right not to kill, protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 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引用次数: 5
摘要
联邦和州政府参与和/或允许各种不同类型的杀戮。这些包括军事行动、死刑、协助自杀、堕胎和自卫或保护他人。在一个多元化的社会中,会有一些人拒绝参与某些或所有这些类型的杀戮是不足为奇的。政府应该如何对待这种拒绝,这个问题比共和国本身还要古老。自殖民时代以来,这个问题的答案在很大程度上受到法律保护的推动,宪法发挥的作用较小,特别是在最高法院1990年对就业部门诉史密斯案(Employment Division v. Smith)的裁决之后。这条条款为这个非常古老的问题提供了一个新的答案:联邦宪法规定的不杀人的权利,受到第五和第十四修正案的正当程序条款的保护。最高法院的实质性正当程序案件表明,某些未列举的权利如果“深深植根于国家的历史和传统”,就有资格受到宪法保护。本文回顾了政府在各种情况下强迫不情愿的公民参与政府批准的杀戮的历史能力,并得出结论认为,不杀人的权利通过了法院规定的检验,甚至比以前承认的权利做得更好。不杀人的权利也完全符合最高法院在凯西案和劳伦斯案中的判决所保护的个人决策范围。当然,承认一项宪法权利并不意味着该权利永远不会受到侵犯。相反,与大多数权利一样,宪法规定的不杀人的权利可能会被足够令人信服的政府利益和狭隘的法律所压倒。然而,在绝大多数情况下,政府将无法满足这一考验,让个人自由决定他们是否愿意参与政府批准的杀戮。
Federal and state governments participate in and/or permit a variety of different types of killings. These include military operations, capital punishment, assisted suicide, abortion and self-defense or defense of others. In a pluralistic society, it is no surprise that there will be some members of the population who refuse to participate in some or all of these types of killings. The question of how governments should treat such refusals is older than the Republic itself. Since colonial times, the answer to this question has been driven largely by statutory protections, with the Constitution playing a smaller role, particularly since the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.This Article offers a new answer to this very old question: a federal constitutional right not to kill, protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court’s substantive due process cases suggest that certain unenumerated rights can qualify for constitutional protection when they are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.” This Article reviews the government’s historical ability to force unwilling citizens to participate in government-sanctioned killings across a variety of contexts, and concludes that the right not to kill passes the Court’s stated tests, and does so even better than previously recognized rights. The right not to kill also fits squarely within the zone of individual decision making protected by the Court’s decisions in Casey and Lawrence.Recognition of a constitutional right, of course, does not mean that the right can never be infringed. Rather, as with most rights, the constitutional right not to kill can presumably be trumped by a sufficiently compelling government interest and a narrowly tailored law. In the vast majority of cases, however, the government will not be able to meet this test, leaving individuals free to decide for themselves whether they are willing to participate in government-sanctioned killings.