你不能再扮福尔摩斯了

IF 2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Lumen N. Mulligan
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引用次数: 1

摘要

根据《美国法典》第28编第1331条的标准解释,所谓的福尔摩斯检验,提出联邦诉因足以认定联邦问题管辖权。2012年1月,最高法院在米姆斯诉阿罗金融服务有限责任公司一案中,重新定义了第1331条管辖权的这一标准测试,即考虑“联邦法律是否创造了私人诉讼权利并提供了决定的实质性规则”。在本文的第一篇文章中,我对米姆斯法院对§1331佳能的重大改变表示赞赏。我认为,这种包含权利的观点建立在比福尔摩斯检验更牢固的法理框架之上,因为后者与诉讼原因和权利的不合时宜的搭配以及福尔摩斯法官对法律的整体“坏人”态度交织在一起。我进一步认为,米姆斯的权利包容性方法更准确地描述了第1331条原则作为一个整体,有助于阐明-与福尔摩斯测试相反-仅仅提出联邦诉因对于法定联邦问题管辖权既不是必要的,也不是充分的。我还证明,与福尔摩斯检验相比,这种权利包容性观点更关心1875年国会的意图,后者通过了第1331条,以及后来的国会的意图,后者通过了立法,反对联邦权利为联邦问题的管辖权提供依据的假设。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
You Can't Go Holmes Again
Under the standard interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the so called Holmes test, pleading a federal cause of action is sufficient for finding federal question jurisdiction. In January 2012, the Supreme Court, in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, recharacterized this standard test for § 1331 jurisdiction as one that considers whether “federal law creates [both] a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision.” In this first piece to address the Mims Court’s significant change to the § 1331 canon, I applaud its rights-inclusive holding. I contend that this rights-inclusive view rests upon a firmer jurisprudential framework than does the Holmes test, as the latter is intertwined with an anachronistic pairing of causes of action and rights with Justice Holmes’s overall “bad man” approach to the law. I argue further that Mims’s rights-inclusive approach more accurately describes § 1331 doctrine as a whole, helping to illuminate that — contrary to the Holmes test — merely pleading a federal cause of action is neither necessary nor sufficient for taking statutory federal question jurisdiction. I also demonstrate that this rights-inclusive view is more solicitous of the intent of the 1875 Congress, which passed § 1331, and of the intentions of later-in-time Congresses, which passed legislation against the presumption that federal rights provide grounds for taking federal question jurisdiction, than is the Holmes test.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
10.50%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Northwestern University Law Review is a student-operated journal that publishes four issues of high-quality, general legal scholarship each year. Student editors make the editorial and organizational decisions and select articles submitted by professors, judges, and practitioners, as well as student pieces.
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