异议如何成为多数:利用联邦制改变美国最高法院的联盟

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
V. Baird, Tonja Jacobi
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引用次数: 20

摘要

本文建议持不同意见的最高法院法官在其书面意见中提供线索,说明未来的诉讼当事人如何在类似的未来案件中重新构建案件事实和法律论据,以获得多数人的支持。联邦-州政府权力的问题跨越了大多数其他实质性法律问题,这可以在未来的案件中提供一种分裂现有多数的机制。当这种可能性存在时,通过向未来的诉讼当事人发出信号,持不同意见的法官可以在未来类似的案件中将异议转化为多数。我们对不同意见进行了实证调查,其中持不同意见的大法官建议,未来的案件应该根据联邦政府的权力来制定。我们表明,当不同意见表明倾向于将一个问题转化为关于联邦-州权力的争论时,该领域的更多后续案件都是在此基础上决定的。此外,以前的少数派联盟在多数派中占据明显更多的席位,这表明这些信号在系统上是成功的。以联邦制为基础的异议不仅可以改变案件的措辞,还可以系统地、显著地将案件的结果转向持不同意见的大法官的观点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using Federalism to Transform Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court
This Article proposes that dissenting Supreme Court Justices provide cues in their written opinions about how future litigants can reframe case facts and legal arguments in similar future cases to garner majority support. Questions of federal-state power cut across most other substantive legal issues, and this can provide a mechanism for splitting existing majorities in future cases. By signaling to future litigants when this potential exists, dissenting judges can transform a dissent into a majority in similar future cases. We undertake an empirical investigation of dissenting opinions in which the dissenting Justice suggests that future cases ought to be framed in terms of federal-state powers. We show that when dissenting opinions signal a preference for transforming an issue into an argument about federal-state power, more subsequent cases in that area are decided on that basis. Moreover, the previous minority coalition is in the majority significantly more often, showing that these signals are systematically successful. Not only can federalism-based dissents transform the rhetoric of cases, they can systematically and significantly shift the outcome of cases in the direction of the dissenting Justices’ views.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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