机构集体诉讼

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Adam S. Zimmerman
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引用次数: 6

摘要

积压在行政案卷上的索赔数量已成为一种新的“危机”——造成大量积压、武断的结果和新的司法障碍。煤矿工人、残疾雇员和受伤的士兵等着对同样的行政决定提出上诉,而这些行政决定往往导致撤销。从同一个国家寻求庇护的难民在武断的决策者面前玩着一场危险的“轮盘赌”游戏。被欺骗的消费者和投资者无法获得公平的赔偿,因为机构在没有受害者参与或有意义的司法监督的情况下与不法行为者解决了同样的索赔。改革派呼吁增加资源,增加行政法法官,改善律师费安排。但令人惊讶的是,评论人士在很大程度上忽略了法院长期以来用来解决大量人群提出的共同索赔的工具:集体诉讼和其他复杂的诉讼程序。几乎没有任何行政法程序允许团体聚集并解决共同的救济要求。因此,在各种各样的审判程序中,行政机构通常(1)在重复的案件上浪费资源,(2)对同类索赔作出不一致的决定,以及(3)拒绝个人获得综合程序所承诺的负担得起的代理。此外,程序性和实质性障碍- -包括用尽行政补救办法和司法上对机构专门知识的尊重- -往往妨碍联邦法院在机构裁决中向当事人提供班级范围的救济。我们认为,行政机关本身应该采用汇总程序,就像《联邦民事诉讼规则》第23条规定的那样,来裁决由一大群人提出的共同索赔。在调查了机构可以提高效率、一致性和法律获取的现有工具——包括规则制定、决策、律师费和联邦法院集体诉讼——之后,我们发现机构集体诉讼规则通过以下方式更有效地解决了常见的争议:(1)有效地创造了关于反复出现的问题和禁止系统性损害的信息汇集的方法;(2)实现比单独裁决更大的结果平等;(3)在过程的关键阶段确保法律和专家援助。通过这种方式,“机构集体诉讼”代表了行政机构的一种新的决策方式——为同样依赖行政国家获得救济的大批人提供裁决和规则制定的混合。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Agency Class Action
The number of claims languishing on administrative dockets has become a new “crisis” — producing significant backlogs, arbitrary outcomes and new barriers to justice. Coal miners, disabled employees, and wounded soldiers sit on endless waitlists to appeal the same kinds of administrative decisions that frequently result in reversal. Refugees seeking asylum from the same country play a dangerous game of “roulette” before arbitrary decisionmakers. Defrauded consumers and investors miss out on fair compensation, as agencies settle the same claims with wrongdoers without victim participation or meaningful judicial oversight. Reformers have called for new resources, more administrative law judges and improved attorney fee arrangements. But surprisingly, commentators have largely ignored tools long used by courts to resolve common claims raised by large groups of people: the class action and other complex litigation procedures. Almost no administrative law process allows groups to aggregate and resolve common claims for relief. As a result, in a wide variety adjudicatory proceedings, administrative agencies routinely (1) waste resources on repetitive cases, (2) reach inconsistent decisions for the same kinds of claims, and (3) deny individuals access to the affordable representation that aggregate procedures otherwise promise. Moreover, procedural and substantive hurdles — including exhaustion of administrative remedies and judicial deference to agency expertise — often prevent federal courts from providing class-wide relief to parties in agency adjudications.We argue that agencies themselves should adopt aggregation procedures, like those under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to adjudicate common claims raised by large groups of people. After surveying the current tools by which agencies could promote more efficiency, consistency and legal access — including rulemaking, stare decisis, attorneys fees and federal court class actions — we find agency class action rules more effectively resolve common disputes by: (1) efficiently creating ways to pool information about recurring problems and enjoin systemic harms; (2) achieving greater equality in outcomes than individual adjudication; and (3) securing legal and expert assistance at a critical stage in the process. In this way, The Agency Class Action represents a new kind of decision-making for administrative agencies — a blend of adjudication and rulemaking for large groups of people who similarly depend upon the administrative state for relief.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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