揭露一个看门人:为什么美国证券交易委员会应该强制披露有关董事和管理人员责任保险政策的细节

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
Sean J. Griffith
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引用次数: 53

摘要

本文探讨了公司治理与董事责任保险之间的关系。它认为,D&O保险公司充当公司治理的看门人和担保人,筛选和定价公司治理风险,以保持其风险池的盈利能力。因此,D&O保费提供了保险人对公司治理质量的评估。最基本的是,公司治理良好的公司支付相对较低的董事及行政费用,而公司治理较差的公司支付较高的董事及行政费用。这种简单的关系可以向投资者和其他资本市场参与者传递重要信息。不幸的是,没有发出信号。公司本身缺乏披露这些信息的动力,美国证券监管机构也不要求注册人提供这些信息。因此,本文主张对美国证券监管进行改革,强制披露D&O政策细节——特别是每种保险类型下的保费、限额和保留,以及保险公司的身份。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies
This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Most basically, firms with good corporate governance pay relatively low D&O premiums while firms with worse corporate governance pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do not require registrants to provide this information. This Essay therefore advocates a change to U.S. securities regulation, making disclosure of D&O policy details - specifically premiums, limits and retentions under each type of coverage, as well as the identity of the insurer - mandatory.
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CiteScore
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